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Abstract
Analysis of Single Event Upsets Propagation at Register Transfer Level
in Combinational and Sequential Circuits Based on Satisfiability
Modulo Theories
Ghaith Kazma
The progressive scaling of semiconductor technologies has led to significant perfor-
mance improvements in digital designs. However, ultra-deep sub-micron technologies
have increased the vulnerability of VLSI designs to soft errors. In order to allow a
cost-effective reliability aware design process, it is critical to assess soft error reliabil-
ity parameters in early design stages. This thesis proposes a new technique to model,
analyze and estimate the propagation of Single Event Upsets (SEUs) in combinational
and sequential designs described at the Register Transfer Level (RTL) using Satisfi-
ability Modulo Theories (SMT). The propagation of SEUs through RTL bit-vector
constructs is modeled as a Satisfiability problem using the SMT theory of bit-vectors.
At first, for combinational designs, two different analysis techniques, concrete and
abstract modeling, are used in order to investigate the efficiency and accuracy of a
data type reduction technique for soft error analysis. To analyze the vulnerability
of the combinational circuits, we compute the Soft Error Rate (SER), which is a
summation of the propagation probabilities. Concrete modeling uses two versions
of the design, one faulty and one fault-free, in order to analyze SEU propagation.
Abstract modeling uses a data type reduction technique to evaluate the difference in
performance and accuracy over the first method. Experimental results demonstrate
that the loss in accuracy due to abstract modeling depends on the design behavior.
However, abstract modeling allows to reduce processing time significantly.
iii
Following this first approach, the methodology is then extended to model and
analyze SEU propagation in sequential circuits at RTL. In order to estimate the
vulnerability of sequential circuits to soft errors, the methodology must be adapted
to represent state transitions. To do so, we present an approach that uses circuit
unrolling. This approach uses multiple unrolled copies of the design to represent
the various state transitions. The fault propagation is then analyzed through a cer-
tain number of states. Useful information regarding the vulnerability to SEUs of
the sequential circuit can then be generated. The propagation probabilities can be
computed from the SEU injection cycle to multiple subsequent cycles. These results
are then used to estimate the circuit Soft Error Rate (SER). Experimental results
demonstrate the effectiveness and the applicability of the proposed approach.
Finally, we present a new methodology to estimate digital circuit vulnerability to
soft errors at Register Transfer Level (RTL). Single Event Upsets (SEUs) propagation
through RTL bit-vector operations is modeled and analyzed using a different modeling
approach based on Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMTs). The objective of this new
approach is to improve the efficiency of the analysis. For instance, the bit-vector
reduction operators and arithmetic operators were modeled in SMT to include the
fault propagation properties. This approach uses only one copy of the design to do
the analysis. This means that the fault propagation properties are embedded within
the SMT equivalent of the RTL constructs themselves, and therefore does not require
two-copies of the design to analyze. In order to illustrate the practical utilization
of our work, we have analyzed different RTL combinational circuits. Experimental
results demonstrate that the proposed framework is faster than other comparable
contemporary techniques. Moreover, it provides more accurate and detailed results
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A Single Event Upset (SEU) is a type of Single Event Effect (SEE). SEEs can be
caused by galactic cosmic rays, cosmic solar particles or trapped protons in radiation
belts [3]. SEEs induced by heavy ions, protons, and neutrons can seriously affect
the reliability of electronic devices. For this reason, this has stimulated research on
understanding and reducing the effects of SEEs by means of mitigation techniques
[4]. Cosmic ray neutrons were recently found to cause errors even at ground level [5].
SEUs are a major source of soft errors in digital designs and modern electronic
systems. Soft errors induced by SEUs have become one of the most challenging issues
that impact the reliability of modern electronic systems. Digital circuits are more
vulnerable to SEUs as the technology scales down. It is important to analyze and
estimate the impact of SEUs on the behavior of digital designs.
In this section we present the motivation behind our work. We first discuss why
there is a need to develop better and more efficient techniques to analyze the impact
of SEUs in digital circuit early in the design cycle. We then discuss the contributions
and the outline of this thesis.
1
1.1 Motivation
Soft errors induced by Single Event Effects (SEEs) such as Single Event Upsets (SEUs)
and Single Event Transients (SETs) have become one of the most challenging issues
that impact the reliability of modern electronic systems. The Soft Error Rate (SER)
per chip has been reported to increase 100-fold from the 180nm to the 16nm CMOS
technology nodes [6].
Aggressive technology scaling over the last several decades has made it harder for
designers to guarantee the correct functionality of chips in the field. Although expo-
nential growth in the number of transistors per chip has brought tremendous progress
in the performance of semiconductor devices, it has increased their vulnerability to
soft errors. Soft errors due to SEUs are one of the major reliability concerns in digital
designs. There is, therefore, a growing need to analyze and estimate the impact of
soft errors at an early stage in the design cycle.
A single particle hit on the state elements of a digital circuit can propagate through
the circuit and affect the output at different clock cycles. Thus, in order to achieve cost
efficient and reliable computing, it is crucial to take the reliability into consideration
alongside the conventional area, power, and performance metrics in the design flow.
Moreover, analyzing soft errors in digital circuits is even more important due to
the increased demand of commercial off the shelf (COTS) electronic components for
avionics.
SEUs were responsible for the catastrophic failure and the recall of many safety
critical systems. Such systems include implantable cardiac pacemakers [7] and im-
plantable cardiac defibrillators [8].
This kind of failure has made it critical to analyze the vulnerability to soft errors
and to apply efficient fault mitigation techniques to circuits used in critical systems.
It is much more efficient for designers to apply fault mitigation techniques, such as
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) [9], early in the design cycles.
Most contemporary techniques analyze the effect of SEUs and SETs at circuit
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level and gate level. SETs are affected by logical masking, electrical masking and
latching window masking, while SEUs are only affected by logical masking. SETs are
pulses with a certain duration and therefore, they can be masked due to electrical
masking. For an SET or an SEU to propagate, it must be on a sensitized path from
the location where it occurred to a primary output or a state element. This means
that it should not be masked by the logical operations of the gates on its propagation
path. For an SET, depending on the electrical properties of the gates it goes through
on its propagation path, its duration (or pulse width) can be attenuated and masked
before reaching a latch. If the pulse does not reach the state elements within the
latching window, it is said to be masked by the latching window.
SEUs occur directly at the state elements, i.e., a bit-flip due to a direct particle
hit, occurs at the latch itself. In this case, only logical masking can prevent an
SEU from propagating to the primary outputs of a combinational circuit, or other
state elements at subsequent clock cycles. Consequently, RTL descriptions of digital
circuits provide sufficient information to analyze the propagation of SEUs, since only
information regarding logical masking properties is required.
Early in the design cycle, digital circuits are defined at higher abstraction levels.
This work deals with the soft error analysis of circuits described at Register Transfer
Level (RTL). At RTL, circuit level details are not available and therefore this work
focuses on the analysis of SEUs propagation in combinational and sequential circuits.
Conventionally, analyzing soft error glitches was done at circuit level, which re-
quires a level of detail not available early in the design flow. However, applying
mitigation techniques at later stages in the design cycle can be very costly. For this
reason, there is an important need to develop techniques to analyze the impact of
SEUs earlier.
At circuit level, parameters extraction and detailed simulations can provide a
certain level of accuracy for phenomena such as electrical masking and SET width
variation. However, when dealing with SEUs, this level of detail is not necessary.
Moreover, the analysis at circuit level is very computationally intensive and would be
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intractable at the chip level. In other words, this type of analysis could be conducted
on hundreds of transistors at most. Moreover, this type of approach are not applicable
to RTL level constructs, due to a much higher level of abstraction. Therefore, the
techniques at circuit level are not efficient to model SEU propagation at RTL.
At gate level, several techniques have been developed to analyze the effects of
SEUs and SETs. Performing such analysis at the gate level requires the synthesis of
RTL designs to gate level to be able to analyze their vulnerability to SETs and SEUs.
Some of these techniques are very resource hungry and fail to analyze complex digital
designs.
At RTL, the state of the art is lacking in techniques to analyze the soft error rates.
At higher level of abstraction, the work focuses on analyzing the propagation of SEUs,
since in RTL descriptions, loading and timing details are not available. Although some
techniques allow the analysis of SEUs at high level, they still require the synthesis of
RTL designs, due to their inability to model the higher level constructs used at RTL,
e.g. case statements, if statements and linear arithmetic.
As we will see in Section 2.2.2, some techniques have recently been proposed to
analyze SEU propagation at RTL. Researchers have proposed modeling approaches
that use probabilistic model checking while other techniques use Boolean Satisfiability
(SAT) modeling to analyze soft errors at RTL. Some of these techniques fail to handle
moderately sized circuits while others cannot handle high level RTL constructs. Such
techniques will still require the synthesis of the design from RTL to gate level in order
to be applicable.
To summarize, due to the risks caused by SEUs in safety critical systems, it has
become crucial to develop new techniques to analyze the impact of SEUs on digital
circuits. This will give designers better insight regarding design vulnerability to soft
errors early in the design stages. Most available techniques can only deal with the
analysis of SEU propagation at gate level and circuit level. However, in order to apply
efficient fault mitigation techniques, it is important to obtain Soft Error vulnerability
in digital designs in early stages of design.
4
1.2 Thesis Contribution
In previous work, SEUs are analyzed at gate level and RTL through simulation based
techniques and formal based techniques. Simulation based techniques often suffer
from accuracy problems. In fact, even for small designs, simulation for all input vec-
tors to study fault propagation becomes intractable which results in loss of accuracy.
In formal based techniques, several methodologies were proposed. Such tech-
niques include modeling the SEU propagation at RTL as Discrete Time Markov
Chains (DTMCs) such as [10] and [2]. Those properties are then verified against
the constructed model using the PRISM model checker [11]. Some techniques use
SAT Solvers to model the propagation of SEUs at RTL such as [1]. Using Pure
Boolean SAT to model RTL constructs require to convert most RTL operations to
Pure Boolean form. Therefore, those techniques require the synthesis of the design
into a gate level netlist to be able to analyze the SEU propagation using a set of
assertions.
In this work, we propose a new modeling and analysis approach to verify the
propagation of SEUs using Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMTs). Our approach is
significantly faster than simulation based techniques while still offering great accu-
racy. Our technique is used to compute propagation probabilities and the Soft Error
Rate (SER). The SER is essentially a measure to estimate the overall vulnerability
of a circuit. Our work focuses on the logical masking property since at RTL, the
information for electrical masking and latching window masking is not available. We
model and analyze the fault propagation problem into a satisfiability problem using
SMT and the Microsoft Z3 SMT solver [12].
We investigate the benefits and disadvantages of using a data type reduction tech-
nique with our proposed SMT modeling of SEU propagation. We also investigate the
advantages of using SMT modeling over Pure Boolean SAT modeling when analyzing
high level RTL circuits. SMTs allow to model RTL constructs into SMT format and
verify the SEU propagation against a set of assertions. The advantage of SMT over
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SAT, is that SAT based techniques require the use of synthesis tools, to take the RTL
hardware description and produce a gate level netlist in order to apply the SAT level
modeling.
We use our approach to analyze the vulnerability of combinational circuits at
first, then the technique is extended and applied to sequential circuits. At first,
the developed SMT model will use two copies of the design, one fault-free and one
faulty version. The SEU is injected at one version and the outputs are compared
to check fo fault propagation. For analyzing SEU propagation in sequential circuits,
the combinational part of the design is unrolled to simulate the propagation of SEU
through several clock cycles.
To improve our first modeling approach, we developed a library of SMT functions
using Microsoft Z3’s Python API [12]. The purpose of this new approach, is to create
Python functions that use SMT operations to model the basic Verilog and VHDL
RTL operations by including the fault propagation properties within the functions.
This allows to directly model RTL designs without requiring two copies of the design.
In addition to the proposed modeling, we investigate the applicability of the pro-
posed analysis by analyzing the vulnerability of several benchmark circuits from the
ISCAS85 benchmarks [13] for combinational circuits and from the ITC99 benchmarks
[14] for the sequential circuits.
To the best of our knowledge, techniques to model the propagation of SEUs at
RTL using SMT have not been previously proposed. Our work was published in [15],
[16] and [17].
1.3 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized into four more chapters. In Chapter 2, we pro-
vide some preliminaries on the subject. We start by describing what SEEs are and
discussing the difference between SETs and SEUs. Then we introduce the current
state of the art at gate level and at RTL. Following this we describe what is Boolean
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Satisfiability (SAT) and Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMTs) and their applications.
In Chapter 3, we present our first approach at modeling combinational circuits
using SMTs. To investigate the vulnerability to Soft Error, we use an approach
involving two copies of the circuits under test. We also investigate the impact of a
data type reduction technique on the accuracy and efficiency of the analysis. In order
to do so, two modeling techniques are developed, concrete and abstract modeling.
In Chapter 4, we model and investigate the propagation of SEUs in sequential
circuits. The modeling proposed in this chapter allows the analysis of SEUs propaga-
tion from each vulnerable node to the output of subsequent cycles of the sequential
circuit. This is done by using multiple unrolled copies of the design to represent
multiple state transitions of the sequential circuit. Moreover, the proposed modeling
and analysis provides an early estimate of the Soft Error Rate (SER) of the design
based on an approximate model counting approach.
In Chapter 5, we present a new modeling approach which embeds the fault prop-
agation properties within the SMT model of the RTL design itself. In this approach,
one copy of the design is used. For the analysis, an SMT model approximate counter is
used to investigate the propagation of SEUs. Moreover, to investigate the efficiency
of SMT versus Pure Boolean SAT in modeling RTL circuits, a comparison of the




Preliminaries and Related Works
In this chapter we discuss the preliminaries and the related works. The goal of
this chapter is to give the reader the required information to better understand the
motivation behind our work and the tools required.
First, we define the Single Event Upset (SEU) and the logical masking effect.
Next, we present the various state of art techniques at the gate level and Register
Transfer level (RTL). We also provide an overview of Boolean Satisfiability (SAT)
and Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) as well as their respective most popular
solver engines.
2.1 Single Event Upsets
A Single Event Upset (SEU) is a type of Single Event Effect (SEE). SEEs can be
divided into two main categories: Destructive SEEs and Non-Destructive SEEs, also
known as Hard Errors and Soft Errors respectively. This work focuses on the Non-
Destructive SEEs (Soft Errors) and more specifically on SEUs. The two main types of
Non-Destructive SEEs are Single Event Upsets (SEUs) and Single Event Transients
(SETs). Both of those single events change the state of a device without affecting its
functionality. In other words, an SET or an SEU can potentially propagate to one or
several outputs, thus causing an error, but the overall functionality of the circuit is
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not permanently affected.
In combinational logic, SETs are transient pulses generated in a gate that may
propagate in a combinatorial circuit path and eventually be latched. SETs cause data
on a wire to change logic for a short period of time. They are represented as a pulse
with a certain duration and polarity, i.e., a pulse from logic "0" to logic "1" or logic
"1" to logic "0".
In memory devices, single event effects are called SEUs. An SEU is said to have
occurred when a change in the state of a storage element such as memory or registers
has occurred. SEUs have no pulse width, since they affect memory elements, when
they occur, the value of the bit is flipped. On the other hand, in combinational
logic, SETs are transient pulses that occur in a gate and may propagate through the
combinational path and be latched by a flip-flop. SETs may potentially never be
latched in a flip-flop if their pulse width is not strong enough.
The propagation of SETs through combinational designs is affected by logical,
electrical and temporal masking (latching window masking) while the propagation
of SEUs is only affected by logical masking. The low-level circuit details, that are
required to analyze electrical masking and temporal masking, are not yet available
in RTL descriptions of designs. Therefore, at RTL, the vulnerability of circuits can
only be analyzed due to SEUs.
The effects that can prevent an SEE from propagating to an output are logical
masking, electrical masking and latching window masking. It is important to note
that all three effects can prevent an SET from propagating due to its nature, i.e.,
a pulse with a certain width. On the other hand, only logical masking affects SEU
propagation, which are bit-flips that occur at flip-flops. The masking effects can be
described as follows:
1. Logical masking: An SET or SEU can propagate if the input vector opens a
sensitized path so that it reaches the design output.
2. Electrical masking: An SET requires a minimum width, which can be affected
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by the gates on its propagation path, in order to reach the primary outputs or
flip-flops.
3. Latching window masking: An SET can be latched by a register if it reaches
the registers within the latching window with a large enough pulse width.
Soft errors occur when an SEU reaches the primary outputs of a design. SEUs
can only be affected by logical masking. As mentioned earlier, logical masking can
be described as follows: to cause an error, an SEU must propagate on a sensitized
path from the location where it occurred to a primary output or a latch. When an
SEU reaches the input of a gate, the fault will be logically masked if at least one of
the other inputs of the same gate has a controlling value. This will prevent the SEU
to reach any of the outputs and causing an error.
The same logic that is applied to these basic gate level operations is applicable
to the equivalent logical operators at RTL. Different operators have different control-
ling logic and different logical masking probabilities. The NOT operator will always
propagate an error since its output depends on only one input. The propagation
probability for the AND, OR, NAND and OR operators depends on the number of
inputs of the operator. The AND and NAND operators have a controlling logic of
"0" while the OR and NOR operators have a controlling logic of "1". For example,
for an AND operator with 2 inputs, if one of the inputs has a logic value "0" (control-
ling logic), the output of the operator will be "0" regardless of the value of the other
input. Therefore, an error at the other input will be logically masked. Furthermore,
an SEU will always propagate through an XOR and XNOR operators.
Higher level synthesizable RTL constructs have an equivalent gate level represen-
tation. Therefore, any information regarding logical masking that is acquired from
RTL descriptions of designs is equivalent to information gathered at the gate level.
This is due to the fact that logical masking only depends on the logical operations
of the circuit. The logical masking effect depends on the inputs, since for different
input vectors, different paths are sensitized.
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In the following chapters, the computation of the SEU propagation probabilities
will be used to compute the Soft Error Rate (SER). We will explain in more de-
tails, how the propagation probabilities will be computed when analyzing some RTL
benchmark circuits.
2.2 State of the Art
There has been considerable progress in functional verification of digital designs.
However, the same cannot be said about non-functional verification. Non-functional
verification investigates the behavior of designs in the presence of different uncertain-
ties. Investigating non-functional properties is challenging due to the complexity of
the modeling and the analysis. Moreover, many details about the uncertainties are
not available at high abstraction levels.
In this section, we present the state of the art available at the gate level and RTL.
Certain techniques analyze SEU propagation while other deal with SET propagation.
It should be noted that, techniques that are used to model SET propagation can
also be applied to analyze SEUs, since those techniques usually cover the effects of
logical masking. The propagation of SET through combinational designs is affected
by logical masking, electrical masking and temporal masking. As discussed in Section
2.1, logical masking occurs while the SET or SEU is propagating through a gate and
at least one of the other inputs has a controlling logic value (e.g., "0" for a NAND
gate). Electrical masking occurs when the duration of the SET pulse is less than the
threshold of the gates on its path before reaching a latch. Temporal masking occurs if
the SET pulse arrives at the flip-flop input outside of the latching window of registers.
On the other hand, SEUs occur at registers, and their propagation is only af-
fected by logical masking, which is an effect that most technique that deal with SET
propagation cover.
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2.2.1 Techniques at Gate Level
Several techniques have been proposed at the gate level to deal with the analysis of
SEUs. Those include simulation based techniques such as [18], [19], [20], [21] and
formal based techniques such as [22], [23], [24]. More recently, formal techniques
using an SMT based approach at gate level have been proposed such as [25].
Simulation based techniques have serious shortcomings as they are very time con-
suming for large circuits with many primary inputs. Furthermore, these techniques
have their drawbacks in terms of accuracy. This is mainly because their accuracy is
determined by the ratio of the simulated sample size over the total vector space size.
These approaches have a scalability problem and cannot be applied on all types of
designs.
The problem with the techniques developed to analyze SEU and SET propagation
at gate level is that they cannot be applied at earlier stages in the design. RTL de-
scriptions of digital circuits contain higher level constructs such as if statements, case
statements and linear arithmetic operators that cannot be handled by the above tech-
niques. In the next section, we present a literature review on the current techniques
that deal with SEU propagation at RTL.
2.2.2 Techniques at Register Transfer Level
At Register Transfer Level (RTL), there is far less techniques to analyze SEU propa-
gation. However, some techniques to analyze SEU propagation have been proposed.
Those include fault simulation techniques such as [18] [26] and formal verification
methods such as [10], [1], [2].
However, the techniques to analyze SEU propagation at gate level are not appli-
cable at an early design stage. Moreover, simulation techniques at RTL are very time
consuming. Even formal based techniques fail to handle moderately sized circuits. For
instance, existing formal based techniques, such as Reduced Ordered Binary Decision
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Diagrams (ROBDDs) [23] and Multi-Terminal BDDs (MTBDDs) [2], are computa-
tionally expensive i.e., suffer from a state explosion problem.
Formal verification based techniques are resource hungry when used to analyze a
complex digital design at RTL. For example, formal techniques run out of memory,
even when trying to analyze moderate size designs, e.g., a 14-bit adder [10].
Some techniques have been developed to analyze SEU propagation at RTL using
Pure Boolean SAT such as [1]. Those techniques require the conversion of the SEU
propagation in a behavioral description into an instance of a SAT problem. In order
to do this, they require intermediate steps, since pure Boolean SAT cannot support
various RTL constructs. The RTL description of the circuit is modified to include
the fault propagation properties using a method that uses two copies of the design
and compares the outputs using an XOR operation. The resulting RTL description
is then converted to an equivalent conjunctive normal form (CNF) which is sent
to a SAT solver. The CNF is the equivalent SAT Boolean function converted to a
product-of-sums. It contains the logical AND of the set of clauses that represent the
formula. This conversion requires two intermediate steps. The modified RTL Verilog
description is converted to SMV format using the Cadence SMV tool [27]. Then
tools in the AIGER library [28] were used to convert from SMV format to CNF. The
resulting CNF file can then be sent to a SAT solver.
In this work we overcome this limitation by using SMT to model SEU propagation.
The basic RTL constructs can be modeled directly into SMT format which does not
require intermediate conversions steps.
2.3 Boolean Satisfiability (SAT)
SAT is an abbreviation for the Boolean Satisfiability Problem. The SAT problem is
the problem of determining whether theres exists a variables assignment such that
a given propositional formula evaluates to True. In other words, the problem is to
determine whether values (True or False) can be assigned to the variables of the
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formula for it to be True (satisfiable). If no such assignment can be found, then the
formula is said to be UNSAT, or unsatisfiable.
The problem of Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) is not only of interest in computer
science, since it has also received great attention in other areas where it has seen
significant practical applications [29].
Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) is often used an increasing number of applications in
Electronic Design Automation (EDA) as well as many other engineering fields [30].
More specifically, SAT has been used to formulate EDA problems such as test pattern
generation, circuit delay computation, logic optimization, combinational equivalence
checking, bounded model-checking and functional test vector generation.
Some well known SAT solvers include: MiniSat [31], MiniSat2 [32], PicoSAT [33],
RSat 2.0 [34] and Glucose [35].
2.4 Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT)
The advent of Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMTs) [36] solved the problem of being
restricted to a pure Boolean representation, which is not efficient and sometimes
inadequate when representing several classes of systems. SMT is an extension of the
SAT decision problem, where the formulas are expressed in first-order logic, with
associated background theories. SMTs have been used to model and solve software
and hardware engineering problems. In this work, we show how linear arithmetic and
bit-vector theories can be used to model SEUs propagation.
SMT solvers that support the theory of bit-vectors provides concrete models for
bit-vector operations. Bit-vectors can be used to model designs directly on the word-
level. This proves to be useful when converting bit-vector RTL operations to SMT
operations.
High level behavioral and structural RTL descriptions of circuits include a variety
of RTL operations not available at gate level. This includes arithmetic operations
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operations, if statements and case statements. SMT solvers support bit-vector arith-
metic operations such as addition, subtraction, multiplication and division. Moreover,
they support If-Then-Else statements (ITE ).
Some modern SMT solvers include: Microsoft Z3 [12], Boolector [37], Yices [38],
Yices2 [39] and CVC4 [40].
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed the preliminaries required to better understand our
proposed methodology. We described SEUs and their effects on modern digital cir-
cuits. Then we discussed the related works dealing with the analysis of SEUs both
at the gate level and RTL level. There are far more techniques developed to tackle
this problem at gate level. We described Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) and Satisfia-
bility Modulo Theories (SMT) in order to understand the main differences and our
motivation behind using SMT to model the problem of SEU propagation.
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Chapter 3
Concrete and Abstract SMT




In this chapter, a methodology is proposed to analyze Single Event Upset (SEU)
propagation in combinational designs described at Register Transfer level (RTL). In
this approach we use a well-known technique that utilizes two copies of a given design,
one fault-free and one faulty, where an SEU is injected. The accuracy of the two-
versions modeling approach was proven in [1]. The outputs of both copies are then
compared to check if they are different. In that case, the SEU propagated to the
output and caused an error.
Our methodology utilizes Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) to model SEU
propagation in RTL designs as a Satisfiability problem. We propose two modeling
approaches to analyze the vulnerability of RTL designs to SEUs, i.e., concrete mod-
eling and abstract modeling.
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1. Concrete Modeling of SEU Propagation: In this approach, the generated
SMT models preserve the full functionality of the RTL description and is mod-
eled using the SMT theory of bit-vectors. Two copies of the generated SMT
model are used, the first is a fault-free version and the second is a faulty version
where an SEU is injected. The outputs of both circuits are compared to check
if the SEU caused an error at the output.
2. Abstract Modeling of SEU Propagation: In this approach, based on a
SEU injection scenario, the SMT model is reduced to improve the scalability
by adapting the data type reduction technique used in [2]. This technique is a
form of abstraction which comprises two main elements. First, bit-vectors are
reduced to 1-bit signals and second, operators are abstracted with a simplified
error propagation model. As shown later, this simplified error propagation
model is often quite pessimistic because it predicts propagation over whole bit-
vectors rather than specific bits.
The proposed technique starts by translating the Verilog RTL behavioral descrip-
tion of the design into an SMT equivalent model. RTL operations such as logical,
reduction, arithmetic, if statements and case statements are converted into their
SMT equivalent using the theories of bit-vectors and linear arithmetic. Then, based
on the adopted modeling approach, the proposed methodology allows the analysis
of SEUs propagation using a set of assertions. To estimate the vulnerability of dig-
ital circuits, we compute the Soft Error Rate (SER). The SER is a summation of
the propagation probabilities of SEUs injected at individual bits, therefore it can be
greater than 1.
Experimental results demonstrate that the loss in accuracy due to abstract mod-
eling depends on the design behavior. For example, for some circuits, the loss in ac-
curacy (percentage difference between the computed SERs) was around 187%, while
for other circuits it was as low as 0.03%. The percentage of error for individual in-
jection scenarios cannot exceed 100% since the propagation probabilities range from
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0 to 1. Since we are computing the percentage difference between the SERs, our
values can exceed 100%. However, abstract modeling allows reducing processing time
significantly and an average reduction factor of 67.33 is reported. The reported re-
sults demonstrate that the abstract modeling technique yields considerable speed-up
in computation time at a certain cost in accuracy. The generated results are used to
investigate the trade-off between the speed-up of abstract modeling and the accuracy
of concrete modeling.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains the data type
reduction technique used and how it affects the accuracy of SEU propagation analysis.
Section 3.3 explains our proposed modeling and the analysis of SEUs propagation at
RTL. In Section 3.4, we explain our experiments and results. Section 3.5 concludes
by summarizing the analysis and experiments.
3.2 Data Type Reduction
Existing formal analysis methods can be combined with different reduction techniques
to improve their scalability. SEUs propagation behavior at RTL can be reduced using
a data type reduction technique. The data type reduction technique proposed in [2]
is adapted to our SMT model to investigate its effect on our modeling approach. In
this work, we define the data type reduction technique used as follows:
1. For a bit-vector signal, if one bit is faulty, then the whole vector is considered
faulty. In other words, a multi-bit signal is considered as a 1-bit signal.
2. SEU propagation through register transfer operations such as addition and mul-
tiplication is modeled to transparently propagate from inputs to outputs. This
modeling loses track of the exact location of faults. For example, in an addition
involving two input n-bit signals A and B and output C, a fault occurring at
bit k of signal A, cannot propagate to bit i of output C, given i < k. These
details would be abstracted when using a data type reduction technique. A
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faulty input signal in an addition operation will automatically imply a faulty
output, without providing details regarding specific bit vulnerabilities.
3. For a case statement or a block of if statements, which represents a multiplexer,
if the selection signal is faulty, then the output is considered to be faulty as well,
regardless of the values of the input signals. If one of the input signal is faulty,
the output will be faulty if the selection signals currently select the faulty input.
The main issue with the utilization of such a reduction technique is that we lose
track of the exact error location. In other words, it is not possible to identify the
specific faulty bits in the bit-vector signals.
To better understand the impact of such modeling, consider the RTL signal as-
signment shown in Listing 3.1. The bit-vectors next_addr and start_addr are
32-bit signals.
next_addr = start_addr + 4 ;
addr_msb = next_addr [ 3 1 : 1 6 ] ;
addr_lsb = next_addr [ 1 5 : 0 ] ;
Listing 3.1: RTL Assignment Example
Instead of performing an SEU injection at every bit of the 32-bit start_addr
signal, the signal is reduced to a single bit. It is assumed that if start_addr is
faulty, then next_addr is faulty.
However, a certain output of the circuit may only depend on the value of certain
bits of the next_addr signal while the fault is present in some other bits. In Listing
3.1, the addr_msb signal depends on the uppermost 16 bits of next_addr while
addr_lsb depends on the lower 16 bits. In this case, the output may mistakenly be
considered faulty for several SEU injection scenarios.
As another example, consider the 2-bit RTL multiplexer shown in Figure 3.1.
If the select signal sel is faulty, then the output y is considered as faulty. However,




















Figure 3.1: Example of Fault Propagation in a 2-bit Multiplexer
If sel[0] signal is faulty, then this fault will only propagate to y[2] and y[3]. The
propagation of the fault is conditional on having an active path from the sel signal
to the output i.e., the fault is not logically masked. Given sel[0] is faulty, an error
will occur at y[3] only if sel[1] is "0". On the other hand, a fault at sel[0] will
always propagate to y[2], regardless of the state of sel[1]. Similarly, a fault at sel[0]
will never propagate to outputs y[0] and y[1]. However, this level of detail is fully
abstracted when using this data type reduction technique. Therefore, the computed
vulnerability of the circuit is inaccurate.
3.3 Proposed Methodology
The proposed methodology introduces a new formal modeling and analysis of SEU
propagation at RTL using Satisfiability Modulo Theories. In this section, we propose
two modeling approaches: concrete and abstract modeling.
The main steps of both approaches are presented in Figure 3.2. For both modeling
techniques, the RTL signals and operations are converted into SMT format. The SMT
solver used to model and analyze the propagation of SEUs in the RTL circuits given is
Microsoft’s Z3 [12]. In order to automate the analysis steps such as fault injection and
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SEU propagation probability computation, we used Python scripting. Microsoft’s Z3
provides a Python API for such application.
Generate Concrete SMT Model in 
Python
Duplicate Design into Fault-Free 
and Faulty Version





Compute SEU Propagation 
Probabilities
Compare the Outputs of the Two 
Versions
RTL Verilog Structural Description
Abstract RTL Constructs Based on 
Fault Propagation Properties
Generate Abstract SMT Model in 
Python
Inject SEU at an Input Signal
Check for Faulty Output
Compute the SER of the Design
No
Concrete Modeling Abstract Modeling
Figure 3.2: Main Steps of the Proposed Methodology
3.3.1 Concrete Modeling
The modeling and analysis starts with an RTL Verilog description of the designs
under test.
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Generate Concrete SMT Model in Python
The first step in our methodology for the concrete modeling approach, shown in
Figure 3.2, is to convert the RTL Verilog description into a Python SMT model. The
SMT library includes operators supporting the theory of bit-vectors, which allows
us to model basic bit-vector arithmetic and bitwise operations. Therefore, all RTL
bit-vector operations were modeled using the SMT library. The circuit under test will
be modeled as a Python function and maps the RTL constructs to equivalent SMT
operations. The input parameters of the Python function representing the circuit are
the primary inputs of the circuit and the function will return the outputs as shown
in Listing 3.2.
def c i r c u i t (PI ) :
. . .
C i r cu i t Logic
. . .
return PO
Listing 3.2: Python Function Defining the Combinational Circuit
Duplicate design into fault-free and faulty version
The generated model is then duplicated into one version considered as the fault-free
and the other as the faulty version as shown in Figure 3.3. The SEUs are injected
at the inputs of the faulty version of the circuit. The inputs of the combinational
circuits are assumed to be latched. The outputs of the faulty and fault-free versions
of the combinational circuits are compared to check if the SEU caused an error at the
output.
This is done in the SMT Python model by having two sets of inputs (i.e. PI and
PI_f) and two sets of outputs (i.e. PO and PO_f) to represent the fault-free and











Figure 3.3: Proposed Modeling of SEU Propagation Using the Fault-Free and Faulty
Versions Model
PO = c i r c u i t (PI )
PO_f = c i r c u i t (PI_f )
Listing 3.3: Python Functions of the Fault-Free and Faulty Versions
Inject SEU at one version of the design
The input vectors of both versions are asserted to be equal except for 1 bit. For
a n-bit input vector A, all bits are asserted to be equal except for a bit k, where
k < n − 1 as shown in Listing 3.4. The variable formula is a list containing all the
assertions for a specific injection scenario. The next step is to add the assertions for
fault propagation then check for the Satisfiability of the conjunction of all assertions
added to the formula.
def injectSEU (k ) :
formula = [ ]
for i in range (n ) :
i f ( i == k ) :
formula . append ( Extract ( i , i , PI ) != Extract ( i , i , PI_f ) )
else :
formula . append ( Extract ( i , i , PI ) == Extract ( i , i , PI_f ) )
return formula
Listing 3.4: Fault Injection Function
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Compare the outputs of the two versions
In [1], the fault injection and output comparison mechanisms are added to the design
in the RTL description of the design and then the whole design is converted into a SAT
instance. The outputs of the fault-free design and the faulty version are compared
using an XOR operation. Every output bit of the fault-free version is XORed with
its corresponding output bit in the faulty version. For each XOR operation, if the
output is a "1", it means that the SEU propagated to this specific output bit. The
outputs of theXOR operations are thenORed together to generate one output. This
output bit is a "1" if the injected SEU propagated to at least one output, otherwise
it is a "0". The RTL Verilog was then converted into SMV format and then the SMV
format was converted to CNF which is then sent to the SAT Solver.
In our modeling, the RTL Verilog designs are directly converted into SMT format
without intermediate conversion steps. Therefore, SEU propagation is analyzed by
simply verifying that the outputs of the faulty and fault-free versions are not equal
as shown in Listing 3.5.
formula . append (PO != PO_f)
Listing 3.5: Fault Propagation Assertion
In this assertion, we verify if under any input condition the injected SEU will lead
to an error at the output, i.e., the output of the faulty version is not equal to the
output of the fault-free version.
3.3.2 Abstract Modeling
In this approach, we adapt the data type reduction technique used in [2]. The pur-
pose of this approach is to investigate the effect and the applicability of a data type
reduction technique on the modeling proposed in Section 3.3.1. The main steps of
this modeling technique are shown in Figure 3.2.
The first steps starts by abstracting all RTL signals and operations based solely
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on fault propagation properties, i.e., the correct functionality of the circuit is not
preserved. The multi-bit vectors are reduced to smaller bit-vectors. This results in a
much smaller circuit and a smaller input vector search space.
RTL assignments, such as in Listing 3.1, are reduced to 1-bit operations. This is
equivalent to a transparent channels, i.e., a faulty start_addr will result in a faulty
next_addr signal. Since bit-level information is not available using the data type
reduction technique, this directly implies faulty addr_msb and addr_lsb signals.
3.3.3 Estimate SER due to SEUs
In order for an SEU to result in a soft error, it must reach the primary outputs of the
design. In other words, an active path must exist between the node or register where
the SEU originates and the primary outputs of the circuit. If no active path exists, an
SEU is said to be logically masked by the logical operation on its propagation path.
The probability that the injected SEU propagates to the output is computed as
shown in equation (1). This probability is computed by dividing the total number of
satisfying assignments (i.e., Num_Assignments) over the reduced randomized search





The Soft Error Rate (SER) is a rate used to classify the vulnerability of digital
circuits to Soft Errors. In this specific case, we define the SER as being the summation
of the propagation probabilities of all injections scenarios to any output.
Therefore, the Soft Error Rate (SER) of a design, which has m fault injection






3.3.4 SMT Model Count
In equation (1), Num_Assignments, represents all satisfiable assignment for a given
formula representing an SEU injection scenario. This number is computed iteratively
by generating all solutions as shown in Listing 3.6. After generating the formula
that includes the fault injection and propagation assertions, the total model count
is computed and divided over the total search space to compute the vulnerability
(denoted as vuln).
In this function we generate all satisfiable assignments using Z3’s Python API. In
order to do so, we generate a satisfiable assignment for the current injection scenario,
and then add a new constraint that prevents the previous model from being generated
again. This is repeated until the formula becomes unsatisfiable. This algorithm is
shown in Listing 3.6.
def genModels ( formula ) :
s = So lve r ( )
s . add ( formula )
count = 0
while ( s . check ( ) == sat ) :
m = s . model ( )
b lock = [ x != m. eval ( x ) for x in va r i a b l e s ]
s . add (Or( block ) )
count += 1
return count
Listing 3.6: Function to Generate All Satisfiable Assignments of a Given Formula
3.3.5 Examples
As an example, the proposed methodology was implemented on the 4-bit magnitude
































Figure 3.4: RTL Structure of the 74L85 Benchmark That is a 4-bit Magnitude Com-
parator
The comparator has 11 inputs and 3 outputs. The Verilog behavioral model of
the circuit is shown in Listing 3.7.
module 74L85 (ALBi , AGBi , AEBi , A, B, ALBo, AGBo, AEBo) ;
input [ 3 : 0 ] A, B;
input ALBi , AGBi , AEBi ;
output ALBo, AGBo, AEBo;
wire [ 4 : 0 ] CSL, CSG;
assign CSL = ∼A + B + ALBi ;
assign ALBo = ∼CSL [ 4 ] ;
assign CSG = A + ∼B + AGBi ;
assign AGBo = ∼CSG[ 4 ] ;
assign AEBo = ( (A == B) && AEBi ) ;
endmodule
Listing 3.7: RTL Verilog Description of the 74L85 4-bit Magnitude Comparator Cir-
cuit
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The RTL Verilog description of the module is then translated into an equivalent
SMT model. Using Microsoft Z3’s Python API, the description of the circuit is defined
within a Python function as shown in Listing 3.8. The function’s input parameters
are the primary inputs of the designs and it returns the outputs as a tuple, which is
a sequence of objects in Python.
def c i r c u i t (ALBi , AGBi , AEBi , A, B) :
CSL = ZeroExt (1 ,A) + ZeroExt (1 ,B) + ZeroExt (4 ,ALBi)
ALBo = ∼Extract (4 , 4 ,CSL)
CSG = ZeroExt (1 ,A) + ZeroExt (1 ,∼B) + ZeroExt (4 ,AGBi)
AGBo = ∼Extract (4 , 4 ,CSG)
AEBo = BVRedAnd(∼(A ^ B) ) & AEBi
return ALBo, AGBo, AEBo
Listing 3.8: Python Function Definition of the 74L85 4-bit Magnitude Comparator
Circuit
In the main part of the program we create SMT bit-vector variables defining the
inputs of the design for both the faulty and fault-free versions. Both sets of inputs are
used as inputs to the function defining the circuit shown in Listing 3.8. The tuples
returned are then unpacked into the outputs of the fault-free and faulty versions. The
main part of the program is shown in Listing 3.9.
A = BitVec ( 'A ' , 4)
B = BitVec ( 'B ' , 4)
ALBi = BitVec ( 'ALBi ' , 1)
AGBi = BitVec ( 'AGBi ' , 1)
AEBi = BitVec ( 'AEBi ' , 1)
A_f = BitVec ( 'A_f ' , 4)
B_f = BitVec ( 'B_f ' , 4)
ALBi_f = BitVec ( 'ALBi_f ' , 1)
AGBi_f = BitVec ( 'AGBi_f ' , 1)
AEBi_f = BitVec ( 'AEBi_f ' , 1)
ALBo, AGBo, AEBo = c i r c u i t (ALBi , AGBi , AEBi , A, B)
ALBo_f , AGBo_f, AEBo_f = c i r c u i t (ALBi_f , AGBi_f , AEBi_f , A_f , B_f)
Listing 3.9: Python Two-Versions Model of the 74L85 4-bit Magnitude Comparator
Circuit
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The fault injection and propagation assertions are then added to the formula as
previously shown in Listing 3.4 and Listing 3.5. The propagation probabilities are
then computed for every injection scenario. The results for the 74L85 are shown in
Table 1.
Table 1: SEUs Propagation Probabilities for the 74L85 4-bit Magnitude Comparator
Circuit












Soft Error Rate (SER) 3.65625
It is possible to verify the computed propagation probabilities and the SER by
analyzing the design structure. An SEU injected at input signal AEBi can only
propagate to output AEBo under the condition that the input bit-vectors A and B
are equal, i.e., A == B. There exists a total of 128 input vector combinations that
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satisfy this condition out of a total of 211 which results in a propagation probability
of 0.0625. When using concrete modeling, the computed SER is 3.65.
When using abstract modeling, we reduce the bit-vectors A and B to 1-bit signals
and compute the propagation probabilities. It is assumed that all the bits of an n-bit
signal have equal vulnerabilities, and that the vulnerability of each bit is equal to the
computed vulnerability of the reduced bit-vector. This will results in a propagation
probability of 1 for SEUs injected at inputs A and B. Assuming equal vulnerability
for all the bits, this results in an SER of 10.5. Using abstract modeling in this cases
results in a loss in accuracy of 187.2%. However, the computation time is 0.6 seconds
while for concrete modeling the computation time is 17.55 seconds.
As another example, the proposed methodology was implemented on the 74283




































Figure 3.5: RTL Structure of the 74283 Benchmark that is a Fast Adder Circuit
This circuit has 9 inputs and 5 outputs. The Verilog behavioral model of the
circuit is shown in Listing 3.10.
The RTL Verilog description of the module is then translated into an equivalent
SMT model. Using Microsoft Z3’s Python API, the description of the circuit is defined
within a Python function as shown in Listing 3.11.
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module 74283 (C0 , A, B, S , C4 ) ;
input [ 3 : 0 ] A, B;
input C0 ;
output [ 3 : 0 ] S ;
output C4 ;
wire [ 4 : 0 ] CS ;
assign CS = A + B + C0 ;
assign S = CS [ 3 : 0 ] ;
assign C4 = CS [ 4 ] ;
endmodule
Listing 3.10: RTL Verilog Description of the 74283 Fast Adder Circuit
def c i r c u i t (C0 , A, B) :
CS = ZeroExt (1 ,A) + ZeroExt (1 ,B) + ZeroExt (4 ,C0)
S = Extract (3 , 0 ,CS)
C4 = Extract (4 , 4 ,CS)
return S , C4
Listing 3.11: Python Function Definition of the 74283 Fast Adder Circuit
The main part of the program is shown in Listing 3.12. The 74283 Fast Adder
Circuit has two 4-bit input vectors A and B, and a 1-bit input C0. An SEU injected
at those inputs will always propagate to one of the two outputs S and C4. This will
result in a uniform propagation probability of 1 for all bits of all inputs, which results
in an SER of 9.0.
When using abstract modeling, we reduce the input bit-vector signals A and B
to 1-bit signals. When computing the propagation probabilities using the abstract
model, we obtain the same value in SER of 9.0. The computation time for concrete
modeling in this case is 6.56 seconds while for abstract modeling it is 0.14 seconds.
We used these two examples to provide a detailed step-by-step description of our
methodology. Moreover, these two examples show that abstract modeling, which
utilizes our proposed adaptation of a data type reduction technique, can sometimes
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A = BitVec ( 'A ' , 4)
B = BitVec ( 'B ' , 4)
C0 = BitVec ( 'C0 ' , 1)
A_f = BitVec ( 'A_f ' , 4)
B_f = BitVec ( 'B_f ' , 4)
C0_f = BitVec ( 'C0_f ' , 1)
S , C4 = c i r c u i t (C0 , A, B)
S_f , C4_f = c i r c u i t (C0_f , A_f , B_f)
Listing 3.12: Python Two-Versions Model of the 74283 Fast Adder Circuit
result in great improvement in computation time with little or no loss in accuracy.
However, in other cases it can result in significant loss in accuracy of the computed
SER.
In the next section we apply our proposed approach on more ISCAS85 benchmarks
to investigate its efficiency on larger designs.
3.4 Experimental Results
In this section, we report the experiments used to validate the proposed methodology
and its efficiency. The proposed modeling and analysis are fully automated using the
Microsoft Z3 SMT solver [12] and Python scripts. Our experiments were performed
on a workstation with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6820HQ running at 2.70 GHz and
with 16 GB RAM.
3.4.1 Accuracy Analysis
The goal of this analysis is to evaluate the loss in accuracy when the abstract modeling
technique is used. For this analysis, different ISCAS85 benchmarks [13] and MSI
components in the 74xxx series were analyzed. In order to compare the accuracy,
the same designs were modeled, analyzed, and their SERs were estimated under both
modeling techniques. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 2. The second
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column shows the number of primary inputs of the design. The third column shows the
number of input multi-bit signals. For example, the MSI component 74283 has three
input signals: two 4-bit input signals and one 1-bit input signal, that is, 9 primary
inputs. The computed SERs based on concrete modeling and abstract modeling are
presented in columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 respectively. The percentage difference in
the computed SERs is presented in column 6 of Table 2.









74283 9 3 9 9 0
74182 9 3 4.57 8.25 80.36
74181 14 5 7.02 5.37 23.44
74L85 11 5 3.65 10.5 187.67
c432 36 4 6.88 8.46 22.97
c499 41 3 32.00 32.01 0.03
It is observed that in some cases the difference in the computed SER varies greatly
when the abstract modeling is used, depending on the analyzed design. For example,
the difference in the computed SER can be as high as 187.67% in the case of the MSI
component 74L85. On the other hand, the difference can be as low as 0 for the case
of the 74283 circuit.
This difference in the estimated SERs between the concrete and the abstract
modeling techniques can be explained by the following reasons:
• The concrete modeling allows the injection of SEUs at every input bit of the
design. Therefore, the vulnerability of every bit is obtained and summed up to
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obtain the exact SER of the whole design. However, with the abstract modeling,
we do not have access to the affected bits and therefore, the whole vector is
assumed to be faulty. This assumption will lead to an over approximation in
the SER in most cases since all the bits are treated as equally critical.
• With the concrete modeling, the propagation of the SEUs can be accurately
traced. However, when the abstract modeling is used, we can only keep track
of the fault state of the whole signal. Therefore, tracking faults at every bit
becomes impossible since the correct functionality of the circuit is lost and only
error propagation properties at the level of signals is available.
• With the concrete modeling, it is possible to exhaustively analyze the input
vector search space for each injection scenario, to obtain an accurate SER value.
However, with the abstract modeling such analysis is not possible and only
an over approximation or an under approximation of the percentage of input
vectors that affects the SEU propagation is generated.
Next, we investigate how much the performance can be improved at a cost in
accuracy when using abstract modeling instead of concrete modeling.
3.4.2 Performance Analysis
The second analysis compares the performance in terms of computation time for both
the abstract and the concrete modeling. Although it is known that abstraction re-
duces computation time, the goal here is to investigate the trade-off between the loss
in accuracy and the gained speed-up in analysis time. Table 3 shows the computation
times for analyzing the same circuits using the two modeling approaches. The fourth
and fifth column represent the computation times of the concrete and abstract mod-
eling, respectively. The average speed-up of the abstract modeling over the concrete
modeling for all circuits analyzed is around 67.33.
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Table 3: Comparison Between the Computation Time for the Concrete Modeling








74283 9 3 6.56 0.14 46.86
74182 9 3 3.14 0.18 17.06
74181 14 5 370.65 2.29 162.21
74L85 11 5 17.5 0.6 29.17
c432 36 4 505.25 3.54 142.50
c499 41 3 92.94 14.98 6.20
Average - - 166.01 3.62 67.33
Table 4 represents the ratio of the loss in accuracy in the estimated SER over the
gain in the analysis time. A small ratio implies a better trade-off, i.e., a small loss in
SER accuracy over a large speed-up of the analysis time.
Based on the results, it can be observed that the abstract modeling has a different
impact based on the design behavior. For example, the best trade-off was observed
in the case of the 74283 and the c499. For the c499 design, the speed-up is around
6 while the percentage of the loss in accuracy is only 0.03%. This is due to the fact
that, all the bits in every input signal have equal vulnerabilities. However, for the
case of the 74L85 benchmark, the speed-up is around 29 while the percentage of the
loss in accuracy is around 187%. This can be partially explained by the fact that this
design is a comparator, i.e., with the abstract modeling many of the injected SEUs are
considered to propagate to the output while they should have been logically masked.
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74283 9 3 0 46.86 0
74182 9 3 80.36 17.06 4.71
74181 14 5 23.44 162.21 0.144
74L85 11 5 187.67 29.17 6.43
c432 36 4 22.97 142.50 0.161
c499 41 3 0.031 6.20 0.005
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a new methodology to investigate the vulnerability
of combinational designs at RTL due to SEUs. The SMT theories of bit-vectors are
utilized. Two modeling techniques were used in order to evaluate the efficiency of SMT
modeling for SEU propagation: concrete modeling and abstract modeling. Concrete
modeling preserves the functionality of the design. Abstract modeling uses data type
reduction to reduce complex bit-vector operations to simpler Boolean operations. In
the experiments, the two modeling approaches are compared. Our results show that
based on the design behavior, abstract modeling can be used to generate acceptable
estimates of the SER in a shorter time. For example, for the c499, an SER with
0.03% inaccuracy can be generated with a computation time that is 6 times less than
concrete modeling. Later in this work, we propose a different modeling method to
improve the efficiency of our computation. Moreover, in order to handle larger designs,
we will use an approximate model counting approach. In the next section, we extend
the modeling approach proposed in this chapter to handle sequential circuits.
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Chapter 4
SMT Modeling and Analysis of SEUs
Propagation in Sequential Circuits
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we introduce a new methodology to estimate the vulnerability of
sequential circuits to SEUs at RTL. This method is applicable on RTL word-level
designs, without requiring synthesis or conversion to pure Boolean logic. This chapter
introduces a new modeling of SEUs propagation as a Satisfiability problem using
Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMTs) similar to what is proposed in chapter 3. The
model is extended to handle SEU propagation through state elements. The basic
RTL operations (e.g. logical operators, reduction operators, arithmetic operators,
and conditional statements) are modeled in the presence of SEUs. The proposed
methodology allows the analysis of SEUs propagation from each vulnerable node to
the output of subsequent cycles of the sequential circuit. Moreover, the proposed
modeling and analysis provides an early estimate of the Soft Error Rate (SER) of the
design based on an approximate model counting approach.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we discuss ap-
proximate model counting. In Section 4.3 we present our proposed SMT modeling
for sequential circuits. In Section 4.4 we explain our methodology for computing the
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SER. In Section 4.6, we explain our experiments and results. Section 4.7 concludes
this work.
4.2 Approximate Model Counting
If the constructed SMT model satisfies the set of assertions being verified, the SMT
solver generates a satisfiability assignment. In such assignment, each variable in
the model is assigned a valid value such that the SMT model satisfies the verified
assertions. However, when dealing with real systems with a large number of variables,
model counting (#SAT), i.e., counting the number of satisfying assignments of a first
order logic formula, is a problem of significant theoretical and practical complexity.
Different methods to reduce the complexity of this problem and to eliminate the
need for exact model counting were proposed. One of the main approaches in this
area is approximate model counting. This is used in tools such as ApproxCount [41],
SearchTreeSampler [42], SE [43], SampleSearch [44].
Recently, a new technique that is based on approximate model counting was pro-
posed. This technique was successfully implemented in a tool called SMTApproxMC
[45]. The accuracy and the scalability of this tool were demonstrated through dif-
ferent experiments. Results show that SMTApproxMC [45] scales to formulas with
tens of thousands of variables. Moreover, based on the desired level of confidence,
SMTApproxMC [45] can provide bounds that are close to the exact model count.
Later in this chapter, we will explain the utilization of this tool in our method to
efficiently provide more accurate estimations of the soft error rate due to SEUs.
4.3 SMT Modeling of Sequential Circuits
In this section, we explain the proposed modeling of SEU propagation at RTL. First
we explain proposed SMTmodeling of the combinational part of the sequential circuit.
Next, we explain the unrolling of the sequential circuits. The main steps of the
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proposed methodology are shown in Figure 4.1.
Duplicate the Generated SMT Model Circuit Function




Generate SMT2 Format of the CNF Formula 
Compute the Number of SMT Assignments
Compute the SER at the Current Stage
RTL VHDL Behavioral Description
Add Another Copy of the Unrolled Circuit




Generate SMT Model of the Circuit Using Z3's Python API
Figure 4.1: Main Steps of the Proposed Methodology for the Analysis of SEU Prop-
agation in Sequential Circuits
4.3.1 SMT Modeling of the Combinational Part
The proposed methodology starts with a fully synthesizable RTL VHDL description
of the sequential circuit. The VHDL description is converted into an SMT formula.
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Thereafter, two copies of the generated SMT formula are made. Similarly to chapter
3, these two duplicates will represent a fault-free version and a faulty version of the
design, where the SEU will be injected at the state elements.
The SMT theory of bit-vectors and linear arithmetic allow us to model the various
RTL constructs directly into an SMT formula.
If Statements and Case Statements
For example, the if statements can be modeled using SMT ITE (If-Then-Else) state-
ments. The ITE statement has the following format: If "statement" then "state-
ment" else "statement". For example, for a generic if statement such as the one
shown in Listing 4.1, it can be modeled as two nested ITE statements as shown in
Listing 4.2. Note that in Microsoft Z3’s Python API, the ITE statement function is
called If with a capital I to differentiate from the regular Python if statement.
Arithmetic Operators
SMT supports arithmetic operation on bit-vectors and integer variables. This allows
arithmetic operations such as addition, subtraction, multiplication and division to
be directly modeled as SMT operations For example, the assignment F <= A + B
in Listing 4.1 is assigned in the nested ITE statement of Listing 4.2 as a bit-vector
addition in SMT.
Concatenate and Slice Operators
SMT supports bit-vector concatenation and extraction. For example, in Listing 4.1,
the assignment F <= C(3 downto 0) can be converted into SMT format using the
Extract SMT function as shown in Listing 4.2. Similarly, the bit-vector concatenation
F <= D & E can be performed in SMT format using the Concat SMT function as
shown in Listing 4.2.
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i f (A = 1) and (B = 2) then
F <= A + B;
e l s i f (A >= 5) then
F <= C(3 downto 0 ) ;
else
F <= D & E;
end i f ;
Listing 4.1: VHDL If Statement
F = I f (A == 1 && B == 2 , A + B,
I f (A >= 5 , Extract (3 , 0 ,C) ,
Concat (D,E) ) )
Listing 4.2: SMT Modeling of Different RTL Constructs
4.3.2 Unrolling of the Sequential Circuit
In order to investigate the propagation of SEUs in a sequential circuit, the combina-
tional part must be unrolled to simulate state transitions. The goal of this unrolling
approach is to investigate SEU propagation through different states.
The circuit unrolling approach is used in existing sequential analysis techniques,
e.g., [46] and [47]. Figure 4.2 shows the result of unrolling both the faulty and fault-
free version of the sequential circuit for analyzing SEU propagation. The steps of this
unrolling approach are the following:
1. The sequential design is unrolled by making k number of copies of its com-
binational part. Registers are replaced with wires and each copy (or stage)
represents a state of the design.
2. Two copies of the unrolled circuit are generated, one to be used as faulty and
the other one as fault-free.
3. An SEU will be injected at one of the state lines in the first stage of the faulty
copy of the unrolled circuit. Thereafter, the outputs of each stage of the faulty
and the error-free version of the design are compared for each fault injection as


































































Figure 4.2: Methodology for Fault Propagation Analysis in Sequential Circuits Using
Unrolling
def c i r c u i t (PI , CSprev ) :
. . .
C i r cu i t Logic
. . .
return PO, CSnext
Listing 4.3: Python Function Defining the Circuit
Using Microsoft’s Z3 [12] Python API, the functions which are modeling the com-
binational part are defined using SMT constructs as shown in Listing 4.3. This is
similar to how the circuit is defined in Python as a function as described in chapter 3.
However, the difference when modeling sequential circuits is that the function has an
additional input parameter and returns an extra value. The function’s input parame-
ters are the primary inputs and the previous state, i.e., PI and CSprev respectively.
The outputs of the function are the primary outputs and the next state, i.e., PO and
CSnext respectively.
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PO1, CS1 = c i r c u i t (PI0 , CS0)
PO2, CS2 = c i r c u i t (PI1 , CS1)
. . .
POn, CSn = c i r c u i t (PIn , CSn)
PO1_f , CS1_f = c i r c u i t (PI0 , CS0_f)
PO2_f , CS2_f = c i r c u i t (PI1 , CS1_f)
. . .
POn_f , CSn_f = c i r c u i t (PIn , CSn_f)
Listing 4.4: SMT Circuit Unrolling
The unrolling is done as shown in Listing 4.4. The primary inputs PI0, PI1, ...,
PIn are defined as SMT variables. The initial state, CS0, is assumed to be free,
therefore it is also defined as a variable. As shown in Figure 4.2, the output state of
the first copy of the circuit, i.e. CS1, is used as an input of the next copy until we
have unrolled the circuit n times.
The chain of unrolled copies is also duplicated to represent the fault-free and
faulty versions of the circuits. At every stage, the fault-free outputs PO1, PO2, ...,
POn are compared to the faulty versions PO1_f, PO2_f, ..., POn_f to check if
the injected SEU at the initial stage (CS0) has reached an output. Based on design
criticality and behavior, it is possible to define a threshold at which the analysis stops
and no further unrolled copies are required. As discussed in [47], unrolling the circuit
two times leads to negligible approximation error.
4.4 SEU Propagation and SER Estimation
In this chapter, we use a different approach to compute the Soft Error Rate (SER).
First we compute the propagation probabilities from every input bit to every output
bit, and not to the output as a whole. This provides more details on the vulnerability
of a circuit. Moreover, we compute the SER for the outputs at every cycle following
the injection cycle of the SEU. In this section, the proposed analysis of SEU propaga-
tion is explained in detail. First we explain how SEUs are injected into our proposed
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SMT model. Thereafter, we explain how the SER is computed.
4.4.1 Soft Error Rate Calculation
We define the SER as the summation of the vulnerability of each output at every
stage. Therefore, an SER is generated for every stage following the injection stage
(i.e. stage 0). We define the vulnerability of every output as the summation of the
propagation probabilities of every injected SEU. The probability of propagation of an
SEU injected at register bit i to an output j at stage k is given by equation (3). It
is the total number of satisfiable assignments (Num_Assignments), i.e. initial state
and input vectors that allow the SEU to propagate to the output over the size of the





Therefore, the vulnerability of an output j at stage k for a circuit which has m
vulnerable register bits, is calculated as shown in equation (4).




Finally, the SER of a sequential circuit at stage k, which has n outputs, is calcu-




V uln(j, k) (5)
4.4.2 SEU Injection and Propagation
In order to compute the SER, SEU injection and propagation assertions are added to
the model presented in Section 4.3. To inject faults and check for propagation to a
specific output bit, the initial register state and the unrolled circuits shown in Listing
4.4 are duplicated, into fault-free and faulty versions. The outputs are then compared
at every stage.
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The function defined to inject an SEU at bit i, for an initial state register variables
called regs_0 is defined in Listing 4.5. The formula will be asserted when checking
for satisfiability of the fault propagation scenario. In this function, we add a list of
assertions to the original formula. This function asserts that the initial states of the
faulty and fault-free versions are equal, except for one bit i.
def injectSEU ( i ) :
formula = [ ]
for j in range ( regLength ) :
i f ( j == i ) :
formula . append ( Extract ( j , j , CS0) != Extract ( j , j , CS0_f ) )
else :
formula . append ( Extract ( j , j , CS0) == Extract ( j , j , CS0_f ) )
return formula
Listing 4.5: Function to Inject SEU
In order to check if an SEU was able to propagate to the output at stage k, we
must assert that the output of the fault-free copy is not equal to the output of the
faulty copy, i.e. POk != POk_f.
4.4.3 Soft Error Rate Computation
In order to compute the vulnerability of every output and the final SER, we compute
the propagation probability for every possible SEU injection site to every output. For
every stage of the unrolling the function computeSER is called. This function takes
three inputs: i, variables, and vulnMatrix. The variable i represents the stage for
which we are computing the SER.
The variable variables is a list of the variables of the current SMT formula. For
example, at stage 0, the variables of the SMT formula will be the initial register state
(i.e. CS0) and the primary inputs of stage 0 (i.e. PI0). For stage 1, the variables
will be the initial register state (i.e. CS0), the primary inputs for stage 0 (i.e. PI0)
as well as the primary inputs of stage 1 (i.e. PI1). For example in Figure 4.2, we
see that the output PO1 depends only on PI1 and CS0, while PO2 depends on
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CS0, PI1 and PI2 etc. These variables are required to compute the propagation
probability since they represent the search space. The size of the search space for
stage k is 2CS0+k∗PI .
The function computeSER in Listing 4.6 loops through every register bit and
injects a fault at bit i, then for every output j, it asserts that bit j of the fault-free
output is not equal to bit j of the faulty output. The vulnerability is then computed
using the function genModels, which takes as input the formula and the list of
variables. This probability is then stored in a matrix (vulnMatrix). The SER at
any given stage, is simply the sum of vulnerabilities. In Listing 4.6, after generating
the formula that includes the fault injection and propagation assertions, the total
model count is computed using the function genModels and divided over the total
search space to compute the vulnerability (denoted as vuln).
def computeSER( stage , va r i ab l e s , vulnMatrix ) :
SER = 0
for i in range ( regLength ) :
for j in range ( outLength ) :
formula = injectSEU ( i )
formula . append ( Extract ( j , j ,PO[ s tage ] )
!= Extract ( j , j ,PO_f [ s tage ] ) )
vuln = genModels ( formula , v a r i a b l e s )
/ 2∗∗numOfBits ( v a r i a b l e s )
vulnMatrix [ s tage ] [ i ] [ j ] = vuln
SER += vuln
return SER
Listing 4.6: Function to Compute the SER
4.4.4 SMT Model Count
In Listing 4.6, after generating the formula that includes the fault injection and prop-
agation assertions, the total model count is computed using the function genModels
and divided over the total search space to compute the vulnerability (denoted as
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vuln). In our analysis we performed this step in two ways and compared the results.
Exhaustive Method
In this method we generate all satisfiable assignments using Z3’s Python API. In
order to do so, we generate a satisfiable assignment for the current injection scenario,
and then add a new constraint that prevents the previous model from being generated
again. This is repeated until the formula becomes unsatisfiable. This algorithm is
shown in Listing 4.7.
def genModels ( formula ) :
s = So lve r ( )
s . add ( formula )
count = 0
while ( s . check ( ) == sat ) :
m = s . model ( )
b lock = [ x != m. eval ( x ) for x in va r i a b l e s ]
s . add (Or( block ) )
count += 1
return count
Listing 4.7: Function to Generate All Satisfiable Assignments of a Given Formula
Approximate Method
Exhaustive model generation becomes unusable when unrolling for several cycles. The
number of variables increases linearly thus increasing the search space exponentially.
For this reason, we used the SMTApproxMC tool [45] discussed in Section 4.2 to
perform the same analyses on different circuits.
The results obtained from the exhaustive method and the approximate method
will be used to investigate the trade-off in accuracy and performance.
47
4.5 Example
In order to illustrate the methodology described in the previous subsection, we analyze
the vulnerability of a simple 4-bit unsigned up counter with synchronous reset. The
VHDL RTL description of the circuit is shown in Listing 4.8.
l ibrary i e e e ;
use i e e e . std_logic_1164 . a l l ;
use i e e e . std_logic_unsigned . a l l ;
entity counter i s
port ( c lk , r e s e t , en : in s td_log i c ;
cout : out s td_log ic_vector (3 downto 0 ) ) ;
end counter ;
architecture r t l of counter i s
signal count : s td_log ic_vector (3 downto 0 ) ;
begin
process ( c lk , load )
begin
i f ( c lk ' event and c l k = '1 ') then
i f ( r e s e t = '1 ' ) then
count <= "0000" ;
e l s i f ( en = '1 ' ) then
count <= count + 1 ;
end i f ;
end i f ;
end process ;
cout <= count ;
end r t l ;
Listing 4.8: VHDL RTL Description of a 4-bit Unsigned Up Counter with Syn-
chronous Reset
When unrolling a circuit multiple times, the search space becomes exponentially
large, so for this reason we chose a small circuit to illustrate the procedure in our
example. The circuit has three primary inputs, load, en and cin. The cin signal is
a 4-bit input bit-vector of the value to be loaded into the counter registers. The load
signal is used as a synchronous data from the primary input cin into the registers.
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The en is used as an enable signal for the up counter, i.e., the counter circuit will
count up only if en is set to high.
As discussed earlier, Z3 supports boolean, bit-vector, linear arithmetic and ITE
(if-then-else) operators which greatly facilitates the modeling of VHDL behavioral
descriptions. Most sequential designs contain several if-then-else statements and case
statements. The 4-bit counter in Listing 4.8 can be modeled in SMT using one ITE
statement as shown in Listing 4.9. The ITE statement in Microsoft Z3’s Python API
is written as If with a capital I. We concatenate the primary inputs into one vector
PI and the registers of the previous state into one vector CSprev and extract the
appropriate bits inside the function defining the combinational part of the circuits.
This is done in order to keep the code in the main function of the program unchanged
and only require modifying the function defining the circuit.
def c i r c u i t ( PIs , CSprev ) :
r e s e t = Extract (0 , 0 , PIs )
en = Extract (1 , 1 , PIs )
count = CSprev
count_next = I f ( r e s e t == 1 , BitVecVal ( 0 , 4 ) ,




return POs , CSnext
Listing 4.9: Python SMT Description of a 4-bit Unsigned Up Counter with Syn-
chronous Reset
Since the design will be unrolled to represent the state transitions, note that the 4-
bit register count, which represents the current state is an input to the SMT function
representing the sequential design. The next state of count, called count_next is
then evaluated using an ITE statement and returned as an output.
SEUs are then injected at the state elements, i.e. at every bit in the registers.
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The SEU propagation probability is then computed from every injection site to every
output of the design for the desired number of subsequent clock cycles. In Table 5
and Table 6, we present the results of this analysis for the 4-bit Unsigned Up Counter
with Synchronous Reset. The columns represent the output bits at every stage and
the rows represent the bits of the initial stage register. As discussed earlier, the initial
stage represents the stage at which the SEU is injected.
From the description of the circuit, it can be seen that an SEU injected in any of
the bits of the register count will only be visible at that same bit at the output cout
of the current cycle. The SER for stage 0 can be calculated to be 4.0 as shown in
Table 5. For stage 1, an SEU injected at bit 0 of the register count will be masked
only if the reset signal is asserted, i.e. its propagation probability is 0.5. In Table 5
and Table 6, we show the propagation probabilities and the SERs for 5 clock cycles
following SEU injection.
Table 5: SER of 4-bit Unsigned Up Counter with Synchronous Reset for Stage 0 and
Stage 1
Stages Stage 0 Stage 1
Regs cout[3] cout[2] cout[1] cout[0] cout[3] cout[2] cout[1] cout[0]
count[3] 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
count[2] 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0625 0.5 0.0 0.0
count[1] 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0625 0.125 0.5 0.0
count[0] 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0625 0.125 0.25 0.5
Vul 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.6875 0.75 0.75 0.5
SER 4.0 2.6875
The advantage of computing the SER and the specific register vulnerabilities using
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Table 6: SER of 4-bit Unsigned Up Counter with Synchronous Reset for Stage 2 and
Stage 3
Stages Stage 2 Stage 3
Regs cout[3] cout[2] cout[1] cout[0] cout[3] cout[2] cout[1] cout[0]
count[3] 0.25 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.125 0.0 0.0 0.0
count[2] 0.0625 0.25 0.0 0.0 0.046875 0.125 0.0 0.0
count[1] 0.0625 0.125 0.25 0.0 0.0390625 0.078125 0.125 0.0
count[0] 0.03125 0.0625 0.125 0.25 0.015625 0.03125 0.0625 0.125
Vul 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.6875 0.75 0.75 0.5
SER 1.46875 0.7734375
this approach, is that it provides detailed values for all the possible propagation paths
from injections sites to specific output bits. This information can be used for designing
more reliable circuits and applying fault mitigation techniques on the most critical
paths.
In the following section, we conduct experiments on larger sequential circuits in
order to investigate the efficiency of approximate model counting performed by the
SMTApproxMC tool [45].
4.6 Experimental Results
The proposed analysis is performed using Python scripting and Z3 [12] SMT solver.
The SMTApproxMC tool [45] was used to generate approximate model counts. The
proposed methodology was implemented on some ITC99 benchmark circuits [14].
Experiments were conducted on a workstation with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6820HQ
running at 2.70 GHz and with 16 GB RAM.
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First, we investigate the computation time and accuracy of approximate model
counting using the SMTApproxMC tool [45] by analyzing some circuits from the
ITC99 benchmarks. In order to evaluate the accuracy, we computed the SERs using
exhaustive model counting and approximate model counting. For the exhaustive
method, we generate all satisfiable assignments using Z3’s Python API. In order to
do so, we generate a satisfiable assignment for the current injection scenario, and
then add a new constraint that prevents the previous model from being generated
again. This is repeated until the formula becomes unsatisfiable. For the benchmark
circuits b01 (FSM that compares serial flows) and b02 (FSM that recognizes BCD
numbers) the SER was computed for a certain number of stages following the SEU
injection stage (stage 0). Figure 4.3 (a) and (c) show the computation time required
to compute the SER using the exhaustive model counting versus approximate model
counting using SMTApproxMC.
Using exhaustive model counting, the computation times are 1408 seconds and
3110 seconds for computing the SER of stage 7 of the b01 and stage 13 of the b02
respectively. On the other hand, computing the same SERs using SMTApproxMC [45]
takes approximatively 7.2 seconds and 8.3 seconds respectively. Figure 4.3 (b) and (d)
show the SER computed at every stage for the b01 and b02 using exhaustive model
counting versus SMTApproxMC [45]. It can be observed that the loss in accuracy
is on average 7.7% for the b01 and 0.1% for the b02. The SMTApproxMC [45] tool
provides accurate results at a significant gain in computation time.
The analysis using SMTApproxMC [45] was also performed on other ITC99 bench-
mark circuits [14]. The results are presented in Table 7, which lists the tested circuits,
the number of PIs and FFs of each circuit, the number of stages unrolled, the com-
puter SER as well as the computation time. In our results, we unrolled an arbitrary
number of times. The results demonstrate that the SER can be computed for several
cycles following the SEU injection cycle. The computation time rises exponentially
with the total search space which increases exponentially with the number of unrolled
stages. The size of the search space for stage k is 2CS0+k∗PI , where CS0 represents
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of the Computation Time and SER Between Exhaustive
Model Counting and SMTApproxMC
the size of the current state registers of the initial stage (SEU injection stage) and PI
the number of primary inputs. Small designs such as the b02 can be unrolled for 20
stages and require a computation time of 74 seconds while larger designs such as the
b10 require 2432 seconds to unroll for 3 stages.
4.7 Summary
A new methodology based on SMT is proposed for estimating the soft-error vulnera-
bility of sequential circuits at RTL. The proposed SMT model is able to capture fault
53
Table 7: Computation Times and SERs for ITC99 Benchmark Circuits
circuit PIs POs FFs Stages Comp. Time (s) SER
b01 2 2 5 11 354 5.28 ×10−4
b02 1 1 4 20 74 3.92 ×10−7
b03 4 4 30 3 1698 1.62 ×10−3
b06 2 6 9 11 402 5.46 ×10−4
b09 1 1 28 3 385 3.90 ×10−2
b10 11 6 17 3 2432 9.77 ×10−11
propagation properties directly at RTL descriptions of digital circuits. This allows
to evaluate the effect of SEUs and compute the SER early in design stages. We have
compared the trade-off in computation time versus accuracy of the latter and found
out that a significant improvement in performance can be achieved (up to 37 times
faster) at a reasonable cost in accuracy (as low as 0.1% error). Moreover, the tech-
nique was applied on some ITC99 benchmarks to demonstrate its applicability for
investigating the vulnerability of sequential circuits early in the design stages.
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Chapter 5
Efficient SMT Modeling and Analysis
of SEUs Propagation in
Combinational Circuits
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we introduce a new methodology to evaluate the vulnerability of dig-
ital circuits to soft errors due to SEUs at RTL. A new modeling of SEUs propagation
as a Satisfiability problem using Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMTs) is proposed.
The behavior of the basic RTL operations (such as logical, reduction, arithmetic, and
case statement) in the presence of SEUs is modeled.
The proposed methodology allows the analysis of SEUs propagation from each
vulnerable node to the output. This is done by evaluating the generated SMT model
of the RTL design against a set of assertions.
Using this efficient approach, our goal is to improve the scalability of the modeling
proposed in Chapter 3. Moreover, we investigate the advantages of using SMT model-
ing over SAT modeling when dealing with SEU propagation in combinational circuits
in more details. We take advantage of the improved scalability to analyze larger de-
signs and compute a more detailed analysis of the propagation paths of SEUs. The
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computation times to analyze the ISCAS85 benchmarks [13] circuits at RTL are com-
pared with the results provided in [1]. Moreover, to gain better insight on how much
more efficient SMT modeling is over SAT modeling, we investigate the computation
time required to analyze arithmetic circuits such as adders, subtractors, multipliers
and dividers. Finally, we will compute the SERs based on our new approach with
and without applying the same data type reduction technique presented in Section
3.2 to better understand how it affects the computer SER.
Our results demonstrate that our technique is more efficient than existing formal
based techniques that use pure Boolean representation to model SEU propagation
[1]. Moreover, the results demonstrate that our SMT modeling maintains a high level
of accuracy compared to techniques such as [10], [2]. Experimental results demon-
strate that the proposed framework is about 4 times faster than other comparable
contemporary techniques. Moreover, it provides more accurate and detailed results
of the circuit vulnerability allowing a more efficient applicability of fault tolerance
techniques.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 explains our new
proposed modeling of SEUs propagation at RTL using only one copy of the circuit.
In Section 5.3, we explain the analysis used in this chapter and the Soft Error Rate
(SER) estimation approach. In Section 5.4 we use an exmaple to demonstrate the
applicability of our proposed methodology. In Section 5.5, we explain our experiments
and results. Section 5.6 concludes this work.
5.2 Modeling of RTL Constructs
In this section, we explain a new SMT modeling approach of SEU propagation in
RTL combinational circuits. This approach will use only one copy of the design. The
RTL signals and different constructs are modeled in a way that includes the fault
propagation properties. In order to do so, a new library of SMT function is developed
that keeps track of fault propagation while preserving the original functionality of the
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circuits.
The modeling of SEUs propagation through the basic RTL constructs is explained
in details. In this section, we use capital symbols (e.g., A) to represent bit-vector
variables. Reduction operators will be represented using single symbols (e.g., & for
reduction AND and | for reduction OR).
5.2.1 Bit-Vector Signals
In order to keep track of the exact bits that are affected by an SEU, RTL bit-vectors
are modeled using a data type consisting of two bit-vectors in SMT format. Say we
have a 4-bit vector A, the first vector represents the logic state of the bits (e.g., Al)
and the second vector represents the fault state of the bits (e.g., Af ). For example, in
Figure 5.1, Al = "0100" and Af = "0011" indicates that the error free logic state of
bit-vector A is "0100" and there are two errors at bits 0 and 1, i.e., the faulty value
of A is "0111".
5.2.2 Logical Operators
Logical operators are encoded as bit-vector operations over the logic and fault states
of the input bit-vectors. The operations describing the propagation of faults include
the case where the two inputs are faulty. This will never occur at the primary inputs,
since only one SEU is injected at a time. This work does not consider MBUs (Multiple
Bit Upsets). However, the case where the two inputs of an RTL Logical operator are
faulty is needed to consider re-convergent faults. An SEU occurring at a primary
input can re-converge into two errors on its propagation path to the outputs.
Logical AND Operator
For an AND operator with inputs A, B and output C, the logic state of C is given
by:
Cl = Al ∧Bl
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The bits of Cf are "1" (i.e., faulty) under any of the following two conditions.
The first condition is if the corresponding bits of either input is faulty and the other
is of non-controlling logic. For an AND operator, the non-controlling logic value is
"1", i.e. if a bit is faulty and the other bit is of value "1", the fault propagates to the
output of that specific bit. The second condition is if the corresponding bits of both
inputs are faulty and of equal logic value. Therefore, the fault state of C is given by:
Cf = (Af ∧Bl ∧Bf )|(Bf ∧ Al ∧ Af )|(Af ∧Bf ) ∧ (Al ⊕Bl)
In the example in Figure 5.1, Cl = "0100", which is the result of the logical AND
operation over bit-vectors Al and Bl. The fault state Cf = "0001" indicates that
only the LSB of Cl is faulty, since the fault at Al[1] was logically masked due to the












Figure 5.1: SMT Logical And Operator
Logical NAND Operator
For an NAND operator with inputs A, B and output C, the logic state of C is given
by:
Cl = Al ∧Bl
Similar to the AND operator, the bits of Cf are "1" (i.e., faulty) under any of
the following two conditions. The first condition is if the corresponding bits of either
input is faulty and the other is of non-controlling logic. The second condition is if
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the corresponding bits of both inputs are faulty and of equal logic value. Therefore,
the fault state of C for a NAND operator is given by the same equation as that of
a AND operator, i.e.:
Cf = (Af ∧Bl ∧Bf )|(Bf ∧ Al ∧ Af )|(Af ∧Bf ) ∧ (Al ⊕Bl)
Logical OR Operator
For an OR operator with inputs A, B and output C, the logic state of C is given by:
Cl = Al ∨Bl
The non-controlling logic for an OR operator is "0", i.e. if one bit is faulty, then
the fault will only propagate to the output of the corresponding bit given the other
bit is of value "0", otherwise it will be logically masked. Similarly to the AND and
NAND operators, the fault will also propagate given the two inputs are faulty and
of equal value. Therefore, the fault state of C for a OR operator is given by:
Cf = (Af ∧Bl ∧Bf )|(Bf ∧ Al ∧ Af )|(Af ∧Bf ) ∧ (Al ⊕Bl)
Logical NOR Operator
For an NOR operator with inputs A, B and output C, the logic state of C is given
by:
Cl = Al ∨Bl
The non-controlling logic for an NOR operator is the same as for an OR operator,
i.e. "0". Therefore, the fault state of C for a NOR operator is given by the same
equation as that of an OR operator, i.e.:
Cf = (Af ∧Bl ∧Bf )|(Bf ∧ Al ∧ Af )|(Af ∧Bf ) ∧ (Al ⊕Bl)
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Logical XOR Operator
For an XOR operator with inputs A, B and output C, the logic state of C is given
by:
Cl = Al ⊕Bl
In an XOR operator, if only one of the inputs is faulty, the fault will always
propagate. This can easily be seen from the truth table of an XOR operation. If
the state of one bit is changed, the output will always change, regardless of the sate
of the other bit. However, contrary to other operators, if both inputs happen to be
faulty, the fault will be masked at the output. Therefore, the fault state of C for a
XOR operator is given by:
Cf = (Af ∧Bf )|(Bf ∧ Af )
Which can be simplified as:
Cf = Af ⊕Bf
Logical XNOR Operator
For an XNOR operator with inputs A, B and output C, the logic state of C is given
by:
Cl = Al ⊕Bl
Similarly to the XOR operator, a fault will only propagate to the output bits of
an XNOR operator given only one of the inputs is faulty. Therefore, the fault state
of C for a XOR operator is given by:
Cf = Af ⊕Bf
Logical NOT Operator
For a NOT operator with input A and output C, the logic state of C is given by:
Cl = Al
60
In a NOT operator, fault propagation is transparent, i.e., a faulty input always
causes a faulty output. Therefore, the fault state of C for a NOT operator is given
by:
Cf = Af
Logical Operators SMT Function Table
The following table summarizes the SMT functions that represent the logic state and
fault states of RTL logical operators.







AND Cl = Al ∧Bl Cf = (Af ∧Bl ∧Bf )|(Bf ∧ Al ∧ Af )|(Af ∧Bf ) ∧ (Al ⊕Bl)
NAND Cl = Al ∧Bl Cf = (Af ∧Bl ∧Bf )|(Bf ∧ Al ∧ Af )|(Af ∧Bf ) ∧ (Al ⊕Bl)
OR Cl = Al ∨Bl Cf = (Af ∧Bl ∧Bf )|(Bf ∧ Al ∧ Af )|(Af ∧Bf ) ∧ (Al ⊕Bl)
NOR Cl = Al ∨Bl Cf = (Af ∧Bl ∧Bf )|(Bf ∧ Al ∧ Af )|(Af ∧Bf ) ∧ (Al ⊕Bl)
XOR Cl = Al ⊕Bl Cf = Af ⊕Bf
XNOR Cl = Al ⊕Bl Cf = Af ⊕Bf
NOT Cl = Al Cf = Af
5.2.3 Reduction Operators
These operators are unary i.e., they perform a bit-wise operation on one operand and
produce a 1-bit output. In our model, the output of a reduction operator is faulty if at
least one bit of the input vector is faulty, all the non-faulty bits are of non-controlling
logic and the logic states of all the faulty bits are equal.
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Reduction AND Operator
For example, for a reduction AND with input A and output B, the logic state of B
is the reduced AND operation over the logic state of A as follows:
Bl = &Al
Before showing the fault state of output B for a reduction AND operator, we will




For B to be faulty (Bf = "1") the following two conditions must be satisfied.
First, at least one bit of A is faulty which is determined by performing a reduced OR
operation over Af . Second, all the non-faulty bits have a "1" logic value and the logic
state of all the faulty bits is equal. This second conditions has two cases:
1. The first case is that the non-faulty bits are "1" and faulty bits are "0". The
formula representing this condition is &(Al ⊕ Af ).
2. The second case is that the non-faulty bits are "1" and faulty bits are "1". The
formula representing this condition is &Al.
Therefore, the fault state of B is given by:
(|Af ) ∧ (&(Al ⊕ Af ) ∨&Al)
The correct output of the reduction AND operation on the bit-vector Al is "0".
However, since bits 3 and 1 are faulty, using the equation describing the fault state of
B, the output of B is found to be faulty, i.e. Bf = "1". This is because, a bit flip at
bits 3 and 1, will result in the logic state of A being "1111". Therefore the reduced
AND operation will output a value of "1" instead of "0".
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For example, for a reduction OR with input A and output B, the logic state of B is
the reduced OR operation over the logic state of A as follows:
Bl = |Al
If we have a 4-bit input A with the following logic and fault states:
Al = "0000"
Af = "0100"
For B to be faulty (Bf = "1") the following two conditions must be satisfied.
First, at least one bit of A is faulty which is determined by performing a reduced OR
operation over Af . Second, all the non-faulty bits have a "0" logic value and the logic
state of all the faulty bits is equal. This second conditions has two cases:
1. The first case is that the non-faulty bits are "1" and faulty bits are "0". The
formula representing this condition is &(Al ⊕ Af ).
2. The second case is that the non-faulty bits are "1" and faulty bits are "1". The
formula representing this condition is &Al.
Therefore, the fault state of B is given by:
(|Af ) ∧ (&(Al ⊕ Af ) ∨&Al)
The correct output of the reduction OR operation on the bit-vector Al is "0".
However, since bit 2 is faulty, using the equation describing the fault state of B, the
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output of B is found to be faulty, i.e. Bf = "1". This is because, a bit flip at bit 2,
will result in the logic state of A being "0100". Therefore the reduced OR operation
will output a value of "1" instead of "0".





The SMT theory of bit-vectors allows arithmetic operations to be performed on bit-
vectors. It is therefore possible to perform the multiplication, division, addition, and
subtraction operations (i.e. *, /, +, -) on both the faulty and non-faulty values of
the signals to keep track of the faulty bits. To obtain the faulty value of signal A, we
simply perform a logical XOR operation with its fault state:
Al ⊕ Af
In the case of an addition C = A+B, the non-faulty result is evaluated using as:
Cl = Al +Bl
The faulty result is evaluated using (Al ⊕ Af ) + (Bl ⊕ Bf ). From this, the fault
state of C is computed by performing a logical XOR operation over the two vectors:
Cf = (Al +Bl)⊕ ((Al ⊕ Af ) + (Bl ⊕Bf ))
5.2.5 If Statements and Case Statements
These are modeled using Boolean implication operators (i.e., =>) or using if-then-
else (i.e., ite) operators. In order to keep track of the faulty bits in the output, if
the select signal is faulty, both the faulty and non-faulty outputs are compared to
compute the fault state vector.
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5.2.6 Concatenation, Extraction, and Extension
For concatenation operations, i.e., A :: B, the logic states and the fault states are
concatenated using the SMT concatenation operator as follows:
Al :: Bl
Af :: Bf
For bit extraction, the bits are simply extracted along with their corresponding
fault bits using the SMT extract operator. For signed and unsigned extension, an
SMT sign-extend and unsigned-extend operation is applied on both the logic and
fault states of the bit-vectors respectively. For example, given:
Al = "1011"
Af = "1000"
If we apply a 4-bit sign extension, the result is:
Al = "11111011"
Af = "11111000"
5.3 Analysis of SEUs Propagation and SER Estima-
tion
The main steps of our methodology are shown in Figure 5.2. We start with an RTL
description of the circuit we wish to analyze, then we apply the data type reduction
technique if desired. The SMT Model in Python is then generated using the SMT
Library of basic RTL functions that was described in the previous section. Following
that, we inject an SEU and compute the propagation probabilities either using an
exhaustive model counting approach or the SMTApproxMC tool [45]. These steps




Generate SMT Model in Python 
Inject SEU
All SEU Sites
SMT Library of 
Basic RTL Functions 
No
Yes
Generate SMT2 Format Using Z3 
Analyze SEU Propagation Using Boolector
Estimate the Number of SMT Assignments
Compute SEU Propagation Probabilities
Compute the SER of the Design
RTL Verilog Behavior Description
Figure 5.2: Main Steps of the Proposed Modeling and Analysis of SEU Propagation
at RTL
The first step in our methodology, is to convert the RTL behavioral Verilog de-
scription into a Python SMT model using our basic RTL function libraries. Those
libraries were developed using the Microsoft Z3 [12] Python API. Then, SEU is in-
jected at one bit by setting its corresponding fault state bit to "1". The next step
is to convert the design into the SMT2 format, which is then fed to the SMTAp-
proxMC tool [45] to perform the following tasks: 1) verify SEUs propagation to the
output using the Boolector SMT solver; 2) estimate the number of input vectors that
allow the SEU injected at node i to reach output j, which is equal to the number of
satisfiability assignments (i.e., Num_Assignmentsi−→j). Thereafter, the probability
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In equation (6), Num_Assignmentsi−→j is the number of satisfiable SMT assign-
ments for the current injection scenario and N is the total number of input vectors.
This analysis is performed for all possible inputs and outputs combinations. There-
fore, the vulnerability of an output j for a circuit which has m vulnerable nodes, is





Finally, the Soft Error Rate (SER) of a circuit, which has n outputs, is calculated






As an example, the proposed methodology was implemented on the 74L85 4-bit mag-
nitude comparator circuit shown in Figure 5.3 to illustrate its main steps and in-
vestigate the results. This circuit implements a magnitude comparator by a carry
function with an inverted input. In this circuit, common elements of the three com-
parator functions, i.e., A < B, A > B and A = B are combined.
A high level description of the circuit in Verilog was converted into an SMT
equivalent formula using the developed libraries. The propagation probabilities from
every input to every output were evaluated. These probabilities are shown in Table
9. Using the probabilities obtained from this analysis, it is then possible to identify
the most critical bits (i.e, input and output flip-flops) for SEU propagation. In other































Figure 5.3: RTL Structure of the 74L85 Benchmark that is a 4-bit Magnitude Com-
parator
to propagate to a given output. Using these results, it is also possible to identify
not only the most vulnerable bits, but the propagation paths as well. For example,
SEUs injection at inputs A[3] and B[3] have the highest probability to propagate to
ALBo and AGBo. Such results can be very useful for any SEU tolerant technique to
selectively harden the most vulnerable bits in order to achieve the desired SER with
minimum area overhead.
The probability of SEU propagation from each input bit to each output is com-
puted based on equation (6). Using equation (7), the vulnerability of each output
is computed and the results are reported in the last row of Table 9. Thereafter, the
SER of the circuit is evaluated to be equal to 4.4375 based on equation (8). Note
that vulnerabilities are sums of probabilities that are not disjoint and they can add
up to values larger than 1.
In Chapter 3, an SMT implementation of the two-versions technique was pro-
posed. The goal of the new modeling approach proposed in the current chapter, is to
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Table 9: SEU Propagation Probabilities and Derived Vulnerabilities for the 74L85
4-bit Magnitude Comparator Circuit
ALBo AGBo AEBo Vulnerability
A[3] 0.5 0.5 0.0625 1.0625
A[2] 0.25 0.25 0.0625 0.5625
A[1] 0.125 0.125 0.0625 0.3125
A[0] 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.1875
B[3] 0.5 0.5 0.0625 1.0625
B[2] 0.25 0.25 0.0625 0.5625
B[1] 0.125 0.125 0.0625 0.3125
B[0] 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.1875
ALBi 0.0625 0 0 0.0625
AGBi 0 0.0625 0 0.0625
AEBi 0 0 0.0625 0.0625
Vulnerability 1.9375 1.9375 0.5625 4.4375
investigate how using only one copy of the design by including the fault propagation
properties within the model can improve the analysis.
The statistics class of Microsoft Z3 SMT solver allows to track statistical infor-
mation about the solver objects. For example, we can track the amount of memory
used by a solver object to solve a given set of assertions. It is also possible to track
the number of conflicts encountered by the solver to find the satisfiable assignments.
The number of conflicts indicate the number of assignments made by the theory sub-
solvers that make the formula false. When checking a formula for satisfiability, the
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solver object attempts to find a satisfiable assignment. Given a list of clauses to
satisfy, the solver picks a variable, sets it to a value, and repeats this for all variables
while building a decision graph. If setting a variable to a certain value leads to a con-
flict, i.e. certain clauses become unsatisfiable, the solver backtracks to the previous
level in the decision graph, and sets the variable to another value. If the formula is
satisfiable, a high number of conflicts means that the solver tried a lot of assignments
for different variables that did not satisfy the formula, which means that the solver
did not explore the search space efficiently. A high number of conflicts implies a larger
portion of the search space was traversed by Z3.
In order to investigate the difference between two-versions modeling proposed
in chapter 3 and the modeling proposed in the current chapter, we analyzed the
computation time, memory consumption and the number of conflicts that the solver
encountered when exhaustively computing all satisfiable assignment for the 74L85.
When using the technique proposed in this chapter, our results demonstrate a speed-
up in computation time of 1.1. Moreover, we observe a decrease in the number of
conflicts of 82% and a decrease in memory consumption of about 2%.
In the next subsection we analyze more ISCAS85 benchmarks using the tool SM-
TApproxMC [45]. We will compare our results to the results in [1]. We will observe
that when using approximate model counting and analyzing much larger circuit, the
improvement in computation time becomes much larger.
5.5 Experimental Results
In this section, we report results from experiments performed to validate the pro-
posed methodology and its efficiency. The proposed modeling and analysis is fully
automated using the Z3 SMT solver [12], the SMTApproxMC tool [45], and Python
scripts. Our experiments were performed on a workstation with an Intel(R) Core(TM)
i7-6820HQ running at 2.70 GHz and with 16 GB RAM.
Typically, SEU analysis is done using two versions of a circuit, a fault-free version
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and a faulty version. A fault is injected by flipping a single bit in the faulty version
of the circuit. The outputs of the two versions are then compared to check if the
SEU reached the output. The accuracy of the two-versions modeling approach was
proven in [1]. In order to validate the accuracy of our technique, we implemented the
two-versions based modeling using SMT to compare the results with the modeling
proposed in Section 5.2. Moreover, we applied the data type reduction described
in Section 3.2 on our model in order to evaluate the loss in accuracy due to this
reduction technique. It is assumed that the inputs of the circuits are latched, i.e., the
data comes from registers, where the SEUs will be injected.
5.5.1 Performance Analysis
The first detailed analysis consisted of investigating the applicability and the perfor-
mance of our methodology. Different behavioral descriptions of the ISCAS85 bench-
marks [13] and MSI components in the 74xxx series were analyzed. The results are
reported in Table 10. The computation times are compared with the results pre-
sented in [1] (shown in the second column) which are based on pure Boolean SAT.
Moreover, we compare the computation time of the modeling proposed in Section 5.2
with the computation time of the two-versions modeling that was implemented using
SMT as well. As expected, it can be observed that the proposed SMT modeling and
analysis provides a better solution to analyze SEUs at RTL in comparison with the
pure Boolean SAT implementation. It is observed that our methodology is on average
about 4 times faster.
On the other hand, analyzing the fault propagation of SEUs using a fault-free
and faulty versions of the RTL circuit implicitly doubles the number of inputs and
operations in the resulting model. Therefore, this technique results in significant
modeling redundancy. As discussed in the example of Section 5.4, using the approach
proposed in this chapter over using two versions of the designs reduces the size of
the formula and reduces the number of conflicts encountered by the SMT solver.
Moreover, using our proposed modeling instead of two-versions modeling significantly
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Table 10: Comparison of the Computation Time between the Proposed Methodology,









74283 0.27 0.25 0.13
74182 0.22 0.15 0.11
74181 9.36 7.01 1.29
74L85 8.68 6.45 1.22
c432 266.80 245.22 114.22
c499 46.80 42.11 22.92
c1908 - 432.64 345.78
c2670 - 733.43 548.54
c3540 - 335.11 245.98
reduced the computation time.
Another analysis was conducted to compare our technique with the technique
proposed in [1] for larger designs. In this analysis, we implemented the modeling
proposed in [1] using the SAT formulation and our proposed modeling using the SMT
formulation. Results demonstrate that with SAT based modeling, the computation
time grows exponentially with the design size. Figure 5.4 shows the time required
to analyze the propagation of an SEU injected at the input of arithmetic circuits
using the modeling proposed in [1] (called Boolean in Figure 5.4(a)) and our proposed
modeling for various circuit sizes. For example, analyzing SEUs propagation for a 128-
bit multiplication using the technique in [1] can take up to 1920.0 seconds, whereas
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(a) Multiplication Computation Time














(b) Division Computation Time














(c) Addition Computation Time












(d) Subtraction Computation Time
Figure 5.4: Comparison of the Computation Time Between the Boolean Based Mod-
eling and the Proposed SMT Modeling for Different Sizes of Arithmetic Operations
analyzing the same size operation using our technique takes only 57.6 seconds.
5.5.2 Accuracy Analysis
The accuracy of our method was compared with the technique proposed in [2], which
employs a data reduction technique. This comparison was done in Section 3.4. How-
ever, in the current section, we use a different formula to compute the SER. For this
reason, we did another comparison to investigate the impact of using our adaptation
of the data type reduction technique that was discussed in Section 3.2.
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We also validate our results by comparing the SERs computed with our method-
ology with those computed with the two-versions technique. In Table 11, the results
in the first column represent the SER values computed when using the data type
reduction technique [2] discussed in Section 3.2. The two-versions modeling and the
modeling proposed in Section 5.2 do not use any reduction. Therefore, comparing the
results of column 1 to those of columns 2 and 3, we can observe a large inaccuracy in
the computed SER when using the data reduction technique.
Table 11: Comparison of the Computed Soft Error Rate (SER) Between the Proposed









74283 22.5 16.1 16.1
74182 20.75 5.72 5.72
74181 28.0 18.31 18.31
74L85 13.5 4.44 4.44
c432 25.56 13.89 13.50
c499 32.01 31.23 32.22
c1908 95.65 78.88 81.53
c2670 157.65 127.54 130.00
c3540 96.81 41.59 44.70
We illustrate the reason behind the loss in accuracy when using the data type
reduction technique by analyzing the Program Counter (PC) address datapath of
the MIPS architecture shown in Figure 5.5. The main issue when using data type
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reduction is that it assumes all the bits in an input register have equal propagation
probabilities. Based on the technique proposed in [2], it is estimated that all SEUs
injected at PC propagate through this datapath with a probability of 1. Our analysis
shows that these results provide an over approximation of the actual SEU propagation
probabilities in this circuit. Given equal probability of R-type, jump, and branch
instructions, our results show that an SEU at the 2 LSBs will only propagate given R-
type or branch instructions (i.e., probability of 2/3). An error occurring at bits [27 : 2]
has a propagation probability slightly above 2/3 since these bits are always used for
regular and branch type instructions. SEUs that occur when the current instruction
is a jump instruction have a small propagation probability through the addition. In
Pseudo-Direct Addressing for a jump instruction, the current PC is incremented by 4,
then the four most significant bits are concatenated with the 26 least significant bits of
the jump instruction, shifted by 2 to the left i.e., PC ← PC[31 : 28] :: IR[25 : 0] :: 00.
In this case, an SEU occurring at bits [27 : 2] of the current PC address will be
masked if the current instruction is a jump and the error does not propagate through
the carries to reach the four MSBs. An SEU occurring on the four MSBs of the PC
address, will always propagate to the computed effective address, because these 4
bits are always used to compute the next PC address. This analysis illustrates the
















Figure 5.5: Program Counter Datapath
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Columns 2 and 3 of table 11 represent the SERs computed using the two-versions
technique and the modeling proposed in Section 5.2. The small difference in computed
SER values can be justified by the model count estimation technique used in the
SMTApproxMC tool [45], and not by the modeling accuracy. For small circuits where
the SMTApproxMC tool [45] is able to generate all solutions, then the SER generated
using the proposed methodology is exactly equal to the SERs of the two-versions
models. However, for large circuits, the SMTApproxMC tool [45] randomly partitions
the solution space of a given formula into smaller cells of roughly the same size using
word-level hash functions. This causes small variations in the computed probabilities
of two equivalent formulas.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a new methodology to investigate the vulnerability of
combinational circuits to SEUs at RTL. SMT libraries of RTL constructs (e.g., arith-
metic operations and conditional statements) are built to model SEU propagation.
The proposed modeling significantly reduces the complexity of the analysis compared
to other techniques while improving the accuracy. For instance, the CPU time re-
quired to compute the SER of ISCAS85 RTL benchmarks is on average about 4 times
faster than with other techniques that use pure Boolean SAT to model SEU prop-
agation. Moreover, this speed-up increases exponentially with larger circuits such
as multipliers. The proposed technique improves the accuracy by providing detailed




Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we presented a methodology to analyze SEU propagation in digital
circuits at RTL using SMTs. The purpose of our work was to investigate the efficiency
of SMT modeling for the analysis of SEU propagation. In Chapter 3 we presented a
first approach to analyze the vulnerability of combinational circuits to SEUs using an
SMT modeling that uses two versions of the design. In Chapter 4 we extended our
modeling technique to be applicable to sequential circuits. In Chapter 5, we enhanced
the modeling technique presented in Chapter 3 and presented a new technique that
uses only one version of the design.
6.1 Conclusion
In Chapter 3, we presented our first modeling approach to investigate SEU prop-
agation in combinational circuits. We converted some combinational circuits from
the ISCAS85 benchmark into SMT format. We then used to copies of the design,
one fault-free and one faulty version where we injected an SEU. This technique is
widely used in the current literature for fault simulation. In this first approach, we
computed the vulnerability of the circuits by exhaustively generating all satisfiable
assignments to a given SMT formula that represents the circuits under test. This
approach proved to be inefficient due to exponentially increasing input vector search
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space. To overcome this, a randomly restricted input search was used at a cost in ac-
curacy. Moreover, we investigated the effect of using a data type reduction technique
on our modeling. We adapted our own version of the data type reduction technique
presented in [2] into our SMT model and compared the results. Our comparison
showed that this reduction technique resulted in some performance improvement but
at a significant cost in accuracy.
In Chapter 4, the modeling approach proposed in Chapter 3 was extended to
analyze sequential circuits. This approach still uses two versions of the design to
investigate the propagation of SEUs. To analyze SEU propagation across multiple
cycles, we adapted the circuit unrolling on our SMT model. Moreover, in this chapter
we investigated the efficiency of approximate model counting over the exhaustive
method proposed in Chapter 3. In order to do so, we used the recently used SMT
approximate model counting tool SMTApproxMC [45]. This approach proved to be
efficient as it significantly improved the computation time required to analyze some
sequential RTL circuits from the ITC99 benchmark. This performance improvement
was achieved with minimal impact on the accuracy of the computed SER.
In Chapter 5, we presented a more efficient modeling approach than the technique
presented in Chapter 3. In this approach, instead of using two copies of the design
and compare the outputs, only one copy is used. The fault propagation properties are
embedded within the signals themselves. A new library mapping the RTL operations
to SMT operations is defined. The new defined functions take as input the logic
state as well as the fault state of signals. This modeling approach proved to be an
improvement over the first approach used. It resulted in better computation times.
Moreover, some of the SMT Solver characteristics were enhanced as well, such as
memory consumption and number of conflicts encountered.
6.2 Future Work
Some of the worth mentioning extensions of our work are outlined as follows:
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• The purpose of gaining information regarding the vulnerability of digital cir-
cuits early in the design stages is to apply faulty mitigation techniques. Such
techniques include Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) [9] or gate hardening.
Our technique allows an efficient analysis of the most vulnerable path for SEU
propagation at RTL. Using this information, it is possible to perform a more
targeted application of TMR on the most vulnerable paths. As a future work,
our methodology can be extended to identify those paths and apply TMR to
obtain the best trade-off in terms of SER reduction and area overhead.
• The data type reduction approach in this work is a naive approach to reducing
the circuit under test for SEU propagation analysis. One possible enhancement
would be to enhance this reduction technique to minimize or eliminate the accu-
racy lost in the analysis while maintaining significant performance improvement.
The improved data type reduction should allow to reduce the redundant parts
of a circuit to improve performance, while still providing the ability to compute
the vulnerability of every individual register bit. One possible idea, is to iden-
tify the bits which have a common operation on their path and reduce those
specific bits into one bit, rather than reducing whole signals into one bits.
• Another possible area of improvement is regarding SMT model counting. Al-
though not related to our modeling approach or to SEU propagation analysis
specifically, SAT and SMT model counting is a well known area of interest. Our
approach can handle fairly large circuits, but if we want to deal with very large
designs, it is imperative to dig in the area of model counting and improve the
current techniques available.
• Our proposed technique currently handles SEUs only. Nevertheless it can easily
be extended to analyze Multiple Bit Upsets (MBUs). It is only required to
modify the initial fault injection assertions to do so. Instead of asserting single
bits to be faulty, the tool can be modified to assert multiple bits to be faulty
and investigate their effect on combinational and sequential circuits.
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Python SMT Library of RTL
Constructs
This Appendix contains the Python SMT Library of RTL constructs with embedded
SEU propagation properties. The signals are represented as a Python List of two bit-
vectors. The element 0 of the list represent the logic state of the signal and element
1 of the list represent the fault state of the signal. For example, for a signal A, A[0]
contains the SMT bit-vector variable representing the logic state of A (i.e. Al) and
A[1] contains the SMT bit-vector variable representing the fault state of A (i.e. Af ).
A.1 Logical AND Operator
def and2 (A,B) :
l o g i c = A[ 0 ] & B[ 0 ]
f a u l t = (A[1 ]&B[0]&∼B[ 1 ] ) | (B[1 ]&A[0]&∼A[ 1 ] ) |
( (A[1 ]&B[ 1 ] ) & ∼(A[ 0 ] ^ B [ 0 ] ) )
return [ l o g i c , f a u l t ]
Listing A.1: Python Function Defining the Logical AND Operator
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A.2 Logical OR Operator
def or2 (A,B) :
l o g i c = A[ 0 ] | B [ 0 ]
f a u l t = (A[1 ]&∼B[0]&∼B[ 1 ] ) | (B[1 ]&∼A[0]&∼A[ 1 ] ) |
( (A[1 ]&B[ 1 ] ) & ∼(A[ 0 ] ^ B [ 0 ] ) )
return [ l o g i c , f a u l t ]
Listing A.2: Python Function Defining the Logical OR Operator
A.3 Logical XOR Operator
def xor2 (A,B) :
l o g i c = A[ 0 ] ^ B [ 0 ]
f a u l t = A[ 1 ] ^ B [ 1 ]
return [ l o g i c , f a u l t ]
Listing A.3: Python Function Defining the Logical XOR Operator
A.4 Logical NOT Operator
def not1 (A) :
l o g i c = ∼A[ 0 ]
f a u l t = A[ 1 ]
return [ l o g i c , f a u l t ]
Listing A.4: Python Function Defining the Logical NOT Operator
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A.5 Reduced AND Operator
def redand (A) :
l o g i c = BVRedAnd(A[ 0 ] )
c1 = BVRedOr(A[ 1 ] )
c2 = BVRedAnd(A[ 0 ] ^ A[ 1 ] )
c3 = BVRedAnd(A[ 0 ] )
f a u l t = c1 & ( c2 | c3 )
return [ l o g i c , f a u l t ]
Listing A.5: Python Function Defining the Reduced AND Operator
A.6 Reduced OR Operator
def redor (A) :
l o g i c = BVRedOr(A[ 0 ] )
c1 = BVRedOr(A[ 1 ] )
c2 = BVRedAnd(∼(A[ 0 ] ^ A[ 1 ] ) )
c3 = BVRedAnd(∼A[ 0 ] )
f a u l t = c1 & ( c2 | c3 )
return [ l o g i c , f a u l t ]
Listing A.6: Python Function Defining the Reduced OR Operator
A.7 Signed Extend Operator
def s ignExtend (n ,A) :
l o g i c = SignExt (n ,A[ 0 ] )
f a u l t = SignExt (n ,A[ 1 ] )
return [ l o g i c , f a u l t ]
Listing A.7: Python Function Defining the Signed Extend Operator
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A.8 Unsigned Extend Operator
def unsignExtend (n ,A) :
l o g i c = ZeroExt (n ,A[ 0 ] )
f a u l t = ZeroExt (n ,A[ 1 ] )
return [ l o g i c , f a u l t ]
Listing A.8: Python Function Defining the Unsigned Extend Operator
A.9 Concatenation Operator
def concat_f (∗ args ) :
l o g i c = args [ 0 ] [ 0 ]
f a u l t = args [ 0 ] [ 1 ]
a rgs = args [ 1 : ]
for arg in args :
l o g i c = Concat ( l o g i c , arg [ 0 ] )
f a u l t = Concat ( f au l t , arg [ 1 ] )
return [ l o g i c , f a u l t ]
Listing A.9: Python Function Defining the Concatenation Operator
A.10 Extract Operator
def extract_f ( high , low ,A) :
return [ Extract ( high , low ,A[ 0 ] ) , Extract ( high , low ,A [ 1 ] ) ]
Listing A.10: Python Function Defining the Extract Operator
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A.11 Addition Operator
def add (A,B, n ) :
A_faulty = A[ 0 ] ^ A[ 1 ]
B_faulty = B[ 0 ] ^ B[ 1 ]
C_logic = A[ 0 ] + B[ 0 ]
C_faulty_logic = A_faulty + B_faulty
C_fault_state = C_logic ^ C_faulty_logic
return [ Extract (n , 0 , C_logic ) , Extract (n , 0 , C_fault_state ) ]
Listing A.11: Python Function Defining the Addition Operator
A.12 Subtraction Operator
def add (A,B, n ) :
A_faulty = A[ 0 ] ^ A[ 1 ]
B_faulty = B[ 0 ] ^ B[ 1 ]
C_logic = A[ 0 ] − B[ 0 ]
C_faulty_logic = A_faulty − B_faulty
C_fault_state = C_logic ^ C_faulty_logic
return [ Extract (n , 0 , C_logic ) , Extract (n , 0 , C_fault_state ) ]
Listing A.12: Python Function Defining the Subtraction Operator
A.13 Multiplication Operator
def add (A,B, n ) :
A_faulty = A[ 0 ] ^ A[ 1 ]
B_faulty = B[ 0 ] ^ B[ 1 ]
C_logic = A[ 0 ] ∗ B[ 0 ]
C_faulty_logic = A_faulty ∗ B_faulty
C_fault_state = C_logic ^ C_faulty_logic
return [ Extract (n , 0 , C_logic ) , Extract (n , 0 , C_fault_state ) ]
Listing A.13: Python Function Defining the Multiplication Operator
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A.14 Division Operator
def add (A,B, n ) :
A_faulty = A[ 0 ] ^ A[ 1 ]
B_faulty = B[ 0 ] ^ B[ 1 ]
C_logic = A[ 0 ] / B [ 0 ]
C_faulty_logic = A_faulty / B_faulty
C_fault_state = C_logic ^ C_faulty_logic
return [ Extract (n , 0 , C_logic ) , Extract (n , 0 , C_fault_state ) ]
Listing A.14: Python Function Defining the Division Operator
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Appendix B
Python Soft Error Analysis Scripts
This Appendix contains the code of the script for automated SEU injection and
propagation analysis. The following code computes the SER. In order to run the
script, the Microsoft Z3 Python API [12] must be downloaded and imported. This
script computes the propagation probability for every injection site. It also computes
and outputs the vulnerability of every output as well sa the value of the Soft Error
Rate (SER) of the circuit under test. In order to use the following script, the design
must be defined in Python format using our Python SMT library functions.
for o in range (0 , n_out ) : ## For Every Output
print ( o ) ## Print Output Under Test
for i in range (0 , n_in ) : ## For Every Input
print ( s imp l i f y ( Extract ( i , i , inputs ) ) ) ## Print Input
formula = [ Extract ( o , o , outputs ) != 0 ]
for j in range (0 , n_in ) :
i f j == i :
formula . append ( Extract ( j , j , inputs ) == 1)
else :
formula . append ( Extract ( j , j , inputs ) == 0)
print ( genModels (And( formula ) , vr ) / (2 . 0∗∗ n_in ) )
Listing B.1: Python Script for SER Computation
In order to use approximate model counting, the tool SMTApproxMC [45] must
be downloaded and run separately. The tool only takes as input SMT2 format of SMT
formulas. Our library includes a function to convert any given formula into SMT2
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format. The resulting output must be saved in a file which can be sent directly into
the SMTApproxMC tool [45].
def toSMT2Format ( f ) :
return Z3_benchmark_to_smtlib_string ( f . ctx_ref ( ) , "" ,
"QF_BV" , "" , "" , 0 , ( Ast ∗ 0 ) ( ) , f . as_ast ( ) )
Listing B.2: Python Function to Convert Formula into SMT2 Format
94
